Fidelity Devalues Stake in Blue Bottle, Dataminr, Zenefits Following Snapchat
fortune.com
fortune.com
An immediate consequence of these very public write-downs by Fidelity will be that every other late-stage pre-IPO investor holding stock in these companies will likely write them down too. Further consequences are more difficult to predict. One potential outcome is lower valuations across all investment stages. Another could be less excitement and slower deal cycles. It could get harder to raise capital.
"We thought it was worth more, and it may well be in the future. But if it's not, that's OK, that's why we have a portfolio of 150 companies; some will lose money. We plan on that happening to x% of our companies, and on average we're still lanning on seeing a #x return on the capital you invested."
In other words, this is absolutely an expected part of VC, even at the late stages.
Hypothetical situation with some seriously made-up numbers:
* 2x $100k for 5% investment in companies at say a diluted stake of 2% goes from $10B to 5B
* 5x $100k for 5% investment in companies who go bust
* 3x $100k for 5% investment in companies who are acquired, make 10% returns ($110k per).
Total investment: $1m
Return from non-outliers: (5 x $0) + (3 x $110k) => $330k for a net of -$570k
Return from outliers before devaluation (on paper): 2 x .02 x $10B => $400M
Return from outliers after devaluation (on paper): 2 x .02 x $5B => $200M
At this point, the losses/returns of the non-outliers are in the noise. But man, it hurts to have to explain the "loss" of your upside by such an enormous amount. I don't think VCs would shrug it off as just a part of their overall portfolio, since these are the valuations that prop up the overall performance.
One thing to consider is that a power law distribution (which is how VCs see their investments), remains a power law distribution no matter how far you zoom in, so even in the "unicorn" bracket, they expect a few of the unicorns (Uber/The Honest Co) to do most of the work.
I really wonder if, after all the dust settles, many of these "unicorns" would have been better off IPOing around a $1-5 billion valuation. For sure their early investors will be if the late-round institutional guys are writing down their holdings by this much.
For example, let's say you raise $250MM in a series E at a 10B post money. As a company/founder, this makes you look awesome on paper and super valuable as a company. Meanwhile, the series E investors usually have the top priority for liquidation, meaning the risk is actually pretty small, since the sale/IPO value would have to go below 250MM before you lose money.
The real people getting screwed by these paper unicorns though are the late stage employees being sold options as compensation.
My suspicion (from experience in the mutual fund industry) is that this is tax accounting related. Overly simplistic explanation: Mutual funds typically distribute short term capital gains at year-end, which is taxed as ordinary income (~40%), not capital gains (~15%).
Managers of funds that hold private securities actually have the choice to 'mark down' the prices of their securities in any given month. Think of it like valuing a house - if you want to value your total net worth, you can mark your price as what you want, to an extent (see Trump). Managers often use this flexibility to 'bury' losses in down times, or for tax advantages.
Finally, can't agree enough about who loses in these cases. Employees who vastly over-value options are the folks who lose in this case. Investments made by institutional folks like Fidelity are too small to even register as a blip to their overall funds, and those funds are diversified and managed to handle downturns in sectors like this.
Here's one of the Fidelity funds invested in Snapchat:
https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/composition/3...
It's got $40 billion under management.
There's a document findable from there that lists their Snapchat investment as $10 million (Prospectus and Reports->Monthly Holdings report).
The number 1 holding of that fund is $2,192,901,654 of Apple. So they get roughly $10 million each time Apple pays a quarterly dividend.
I'd also like someone who understands the issue well to let us know whether these mark downs have any tax implications to begin with. I think it might sometimes be the case that marking down such a holding would allow recognition of a tax loss but I don't think that is going on here.
You're right that it won't be a large drop in the bucket. It's not news because it's a large drop in a bucket, it's news because its a valuation change on companies many here follow. Nonetheless, one could object to poor management if Fidelity didn't take this action, regardless of size.
Note - this only gets at the 'why now' part of the motivation. What it means for 1) their internal company valuations and 2) implications for shareholders without liquidation preferences is more interesting.
I think the mark down mostly does two things. It allows Fidelity to honestly inform their customers what they hold, and it signals to the startups that things aren't necessarily going the way Fidelity would like to see them go.
If these securities have been held for <1 year, their gain/loss goes into the short term bucket. So losses (in this case, writedowns) can offset the size of distribution, which is a bad deal for investors.
To a personal investor (e.g. mentioned in the world of WealthFront/Betterment), this is 'tax loss harvesting'.
I'm currently a student job searching and this seems pretty relevant.
Employees (and Founders) have common stock, while Investors get preferred stock.
Preferred stock carries with it a "liquidation preference", which basically means holders of that stock get paid out first during a liquidity event, including some multiple of their original investment. What ever is left, is divided among the holders of common stock.
If the company is publicly traded, then all owners of stock hold the same class of stock (common).
Cloudflare (Series D) $4.35M $4.90M $4.90M
Honest Co. (common) $4.06M $6.87M $6.87M
Honest Co. (Series C) $9.48M $16.03M $16.03M
Meituan Corp. (Series D) $10.00M $12.29M $15.71M
SpaceX (Series G) $7.54M $7.54M $8.66M
Uber (Series D) $80.00M $204.42M $204.42M
Uber (Series E) $3.42M $4.07M $4.07M company name price price price
paid 31 july 30 septUnicorns can only exist in ZIRP. (Zero interest Rate Policy)
In laymen's terms it's called a bubble.
Instead they IPO at 5, fell to 2 and are really worth 1. Now they're seen as a hopeless train wreck that can't be saved and sign of a "bubble."
A silly high paper valuation during funding rounds makes for fun press releases, but it can cause a ton of headaches later (if the company isn't actually worth those amounts... and most aren't).
A couple of examples:
Groupon: IPOed at $20/share, raising ~$700m. They are currently trading in the $2.70 range. From a company perspective, they killed it by IPO-ing -- they took $700m worth of cash, most of which I believe they still have (as of a few months ago they still had ~$1bn in cash equivalents).
Zynga: IPOed at $10/share, raising roughly $1bn. They are currently trading at $2.48. Same basic story as above. Their current market cap is just about double what they raised in cash at their IPO.
So from two perspectives, these companies did exceedingly well: their investors and founders likely cashed out most of their chips at IPO, so they made a killing, and the company received a tremendous amount of cash for their coffers. Sure, Groupon and Zynga booted their CEOs, but they don't care much, and I'm sure whoever they got to replace them is handsomely compensated (regardless of how well they do).
So who gets screwed? Employees, who don't get to sell their shares until the company has tanked, and whichever investors are stuck holding the bag after IPO. But after the IPO, there's not much of an incentive for these early people to care about that; if they get canned, who cares, they'll cash out their $100m worth of compensation and go work at some other company down the street.
However, that can only happen so many times before the "suckers" that were buying these things at IPO catch on and lose their appetite. That sort of thing is in part what's happening and in part why these write downs are occurring. The paper valuation during funding rounds is only real if the "real market" (i.e. everyone, not just a few VCs writing founders a cheque) is willing to buy shares at that value. If the market continues to get more skeptical, and there's every indication that this will continue to be the case, then down rounds are an almost certainty moving forward for many firms.
That's also a big problem for employee options, which typically only have value if the valuation keeps skyrocketing.
http://www.valuewalk.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Fidelity...
2) You are smart; you scream and yell and tell everyone it's worth $1.3 billion.
3) Now even the smartest analyst is going to say you are worth $750 million.
4) A year later, the market is down. You are really worth $40 million.Some executives at big co "swoop" you for $550 million in what they call a steal + you needed the money.
But, I still wouldn't worry about that too much directly. As the article mentions, it's more art than science. If I were Zenefits I don't think I'd be sweating it.
Usually, institutional investors(e.g. Fidelity) give money to VC funds that spend most of their time finding good and reasonable investments.
However, Fidelity and other institutional investors have been investing in late-stage deals, "cutting off" many VC funds and increasing valuation of companies.
http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/shadow-capital-ste...
http://fortune.com/2015/11/12/fidelity-marks-down-tech-unico...
$32 M $16.74 M $14.77 M
I'm not surprised
Some skepticism from investors is good, more due diligence re: valuation is good. This is a pretty mild correction overall, which is good for everyone.
I'd be much more worried if Fidelity were snapping up startup shares at ever-higher valuations without ever reckoning actual performance.
As people who work in the industry, this might mean a mild slowdown in hiring as funding becomes a bit more difficult, but it also may prevent the catastrophic alternative which is the bottom falling out from under us and massive tech-sector unemployment.
Personally I think all of these recent announcements are good for startup employees. For the last few years some of us have been expressing a lot of skepticism about the real value of startup options and how much they can realistically exit for. Between valuation write-downs like this, and the face-plant IPOs of the last couple of years, I think people are starting to see the true value of startup options and I hope it results in people being much more discerning about how they're being compensated.
They raised 1B in that round.
Seems like a non-event to me, people just want to believe these valuations are insane. Are you really feeling that much better that Snapchat is worth $10bn instead of $15bn if you hate Snapchat?
No longer can managers keep selling a dream that was last pitched years ago at their last funding round; they'll have to compensate for underwater options with rising salaries or grants to keep talent around. Certain startups have a habit of delaying sharing bad news with their employees to the very brink of collapse; this behavior will now be in check somewhat.
If you take equity, you are not only subject to dilutions, but also to other investors getting much more preferential terms to you.
I'm not saying to don't take a job because of shares, RSUs, or options offered, but one needs to take a hard look at these things to figure out what their true worth is. And in most cases, you may only be able to compute a confidence interval and not a point estimate.
Fidelity's disclosure makes this seemingly intractable problem a bit less intractable.
Having Fidelity investing in startups adds a whole new layer of public disclosure to the VC world, specially relevant in the light of the large number of stale unicorns.