Optimised to Fail: Card Readers for Online Banking
cl.cam.ac.uk
cl.cam.ac.uk
This is my way of dealing with these issues:
- use a unix box rather than a windows machine to conduct online transactions,
reducing the chance of having malware on the system
- never use an the authorization token from someone else, just my own, which
I treat roughly the same as any other valuable
- get a new one directly from the bank once every year to avoid wearing down
the keypad so the pin numbers stand out
- always type in the url of the bank in full and verify that
again when authorizing transactions
- check the list of outstanding transactions that I'm authorizing
to make sure the amount and beneficiaries match
The things this still leaves me vulnerable to are man in the middle attacks impersonating the bank website, at a minimum this would require poisoning the DNS of the provider, another trick would be to install a keylogger, but this would only get the attacker a bunch of one-time codes (which could presumably be used to recover the pin in combination with the challenges).And of course nobody can rule out a brutal attack on my person to get possession of the PIN code, and I expect that such attacks will increase in frequency.
You could just get into the habit of:
* Put in card, type in PIN
* Take out card, press every digit that isn't in your PIN.
If you have a repeated digit in your pin you might need to press them all twice etc.How about simply erasing all the digits then, after all the standard phone pattern is something that is easy enough to memorize.
The bank teller had a function other than just being a cost on an itemized list, they were people and people are good at spotting unusual patterns.
Once we switched to ATMs and now to online banking the pin taking the place of your digital signature the push is on to make you the responsible party for your bank balance, even though the banks could (and should) take more responsibility and actions to safeguard your balance.
Even velocity controls are not adequate, as the torture case clearly shows.
But then again, in times before all that came to pass it was possible to take your family members hostage while you visit the bank too. It's just that now we don't need you to go to the bank (and potentially alert the police) but all we need is four digits. After that you are literally disposable.
This is the very definition of a movie plot threat: it makes for gripping drama, but is less effective and far more risky than just doing the traditional thing and saying "I'm Bank of America. What is your PIN number?" to as many people as possible. I would be astonished if "tortured for your two-factor identification" was even visible next to old stand-bys like "killed for cash/jewelry/sneakers."