> However, it is not possible for a low-privilege application to defend against the platform it runs on, if the platform is intent on undermining the application’s expectations. To try would be futile, and would necessarily also violate a crucial digital rights principle: The computer’s owner should get to decide how the computer behaves. Dell and Lenovo let their customers down in that way, but for better and for worse, it’s not something that a web browser can fix.

To which the response from the original article is:

>One of the most fundamental principles of information security is reducing the attack surface, meaning that when something is unnecessary and can lead to a vulnerability, it must be removed. Is anything Google could do to make it more difficult for Dell to compromise their customers? Yes, there is. The most obvious thing would be to not allow roots within the local trust store to override HPKP pins. Had Google removed the red carpet to disabling all of its safeguards, where would that have left Dell? Sure, they could still compromise Chrome, but there would be no “Google Approved” method of doing so. Dell would either: Have to give up, or: Literally install malware on their computers. Dell’s stock would plummet.

Thus fixing this would:

1) Reduce the attack surface created by 'accidentaly' publishing a private key for root certificate (especially when removing those certs is beyond the technical ability of the majority of users)

2) Improve the ability of the computer OWNER to decide how the computer behaves since they would be aware when HPKP pins are being overiden.

3) Force OEMs that wish to compromise Chrome to write explicit Malware that will be much harder to handwave away and thus be a bigger risk to their reputation.