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Comment by jdp23 | Hacker News Reader

Yes, feminist philosophy of science does address things that aren't typically found in non-feminist works, even those written by women. In particular, "situated knowledge" -- knowledge that reflects the particular perspectives of the subject -- plays a very big role, and for example leads to a lot of interesting questions about "objectivity".

There are a couple of excellent page on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, one on Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science [1] and another on Feminist Perspectives on Science [2].

[1] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology/

[2] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-science/

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I guess any philosopher of science systematically call into question objectivity, and in recent times will have to come to terms with "situated knowledge" one way or the other. If feminism is defined with these terms, why would e.g. Latour not qualify as feminist?

Good question ... I didn't mean to reduce feminist philosophy of science only to that, although it's a key element. The most important aspect of feminist philosophy of science is that it looks at things through a gender lens, and Latour explicitly rejects that. From "... That Damned Elusive Bruno Latour": [1]

"The social sciences have no 'out there' or 'up there' to serve as a foundation," Latour once told an interviewer. For that reason, Latour objects to feminist critics of science (who elevate gender to a transcendant principle), Marxist critics of science (who do the same with economics), and Foucauldian critics of science (who repeat the process with power). They, in turn, object to him. The British feminist epistemologist Hillary Rose, for instance, in a review of Science in Action, wrote: "By cutting himself adrift from those who point to the dominant interests which science serves and to the masculine composition of its workforce and its knowledge, [Latour] sidesteps the crucial challenge.... Unless feminism engages in a rather sharp struggle for social and conceptual space, both networks and analysis are likely to remain integral to masculinist hegemony.''

http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/9410/latour.html

Ahh, the soft bigotry of different expectations. From your [1]:

The masculine cognitive style is abstract, theoretical, disembodied, emotionally detached, analytical, deductive, quantitative, atomistic, and oriented toward values of control or domination.

The feminine cognitive style is concrete, practical, embodied, emotionally engaged, synthetic, intuitive, qualitative, relational, and oriented toward values of care.

Do you really think this line of thought is somehow "progressive" and "empowering" for us women??

No, I don't see that particular line of thought as progressive and empowering for women in today's world.

However, the quotes you choose are from a section that notes that "Various feminist standpoint theories ground the claim to epistemic privilege in different features of women's social situation" -- and in a paragraph starting with "Some early versions of standpoint theory (including Flax 1983, Hartsock 1987, Rose 1987, and Smith 1974) accept feminist object relations theory ..."

So I'd caution against rejecting the whole discipline based on early views from a handful of a few people.

No, I don't see that particular line of thought as progressive and empowering for women in today's world.

So you reject Standpoint Theory. I guess we agree about that.

Yet you also (seem to) accept the notion of "situated knowledge". But, without any recourse to Standpoint Theory to be able to privilege any claim over another, that necessarily commits you to relativism --and a rather extreme form, at that.

So you either reject the very notion of "situated knowledge" (and thus a great deal of feminist epistemology), become an extreme relativist, or accept Standpoint Theory.

I, for one, reject relativism --so that commits me to reject "situated knowledge"-based feminist epistemology (i.e. pretty much the whole discipline).

I'm not sure how you got from me saying "there are a lot of different sources of standpoint theory" and "I disagree with a line of thought stated by some early standpoint early theoreticians" and "don't reject the whole discipline based on some early work" to thinking I reject standpoint theory. How many times in this thread have I linked to and quoted Sandra Harding?

It's the end of the semester, I'm awfully sleep deprived, and I should be doing work instead --that's why. I apologize for misrepresenting your views.

No worries! But, to reassure you on one point: I'm not a relativist :)

Recognition that the styles exist, that they have (whether they ought to or not, and whether also on some more fundamental level than culture or not) a cultural association with gender, and that the style associated with the feminine gender has in patriarchal societies been devalued -- even to the extent of being treated as invalid and unworthy of consideration -- is both progressive and, if not empowering in and of itself, a fairly important foundation for empowerment.

So, yes.

[T]he style associated with the feminine gender[...]

That very idea is the most profound, insidious form of patriarchy there is. Think about it.

> That very idea is the most profound, insidious form of patriarchy there is. Think about it.

No, its not, and, you know, its pretty ridiculous to make that claim in a venue where the original text is accessible, so that it is obvious the way that you had to deliberately ignore the whole preceding and following parts of the sentence to even make the attack on the phrase you excerpt taken out of context remotely plausible.

Recognizing that patriarchy exists, and that certain associations exist in the context of patriarchy is not, itself, patriarchal.

Relax. I'm just trying to encourage you to think about your deeply held assumption, since you seem to care about women.

And no, I am not "deliberately ignor[ing]" nor taking out of context anything. Don't assume malice where simple disagreement may suffice.

I'm just claiming that the very idea that "[gender-associated] styles exist" is the most profound, insidious form of patriarchy there is. The rest of your qualifiers (viz. independence of whether or not they are cultural, or normative, and so forth) are immaterial: I'm claiming the very premise you start with is incredibly damaging, in profound and insidious ways.

Again, I invite you to think about it. Read Giorgio Agamben's Homo Sacer, but substitute the ζωή-βίος rift with a ζωή-ζωή (or βίος-βίος) rift. And see where that leads you.

> I'm just trying to encourage you to think about your deeply held assumption

What assumption are you talking about?

> I'm just claiming that the very idea that "[gender-associated] styles exist" is the most profound, insidious form of patriarchy there is.

The fact that they exist is certainly an aspect of patriarchy. The idea -- which is a necessary prerequisite to the ability to recognize, discuss, and alter the fact -- is not a form of patriarchy, on the contrary, the absence of the idea in presence of the fact would be make patriarchy unassailable.

> Again, I invite you to think about it.

I invite you to stop assuming that I haven't thought about this issue, quite deeply, for several decades.

Sigh. Nevermind then. Sorry for pointlessly rising your blood pressure.

(And to all, for bikeshedding this thread.)

I'm still not sure I understand your objection. Is it specifically to the phrasing that "gender-associated styles exist"?

How about the alternate phrasing of "Patriarchal society has historically associated styles with gender, devalued those styles typically associated with women, and used this as a tool to reinforce patriarchy" ... is that equally objectionable?

Sorry I wasn't clear.

My objection is to the very idea that 'styles' exist in the first place. I claim that's the primal rift that starts it all.

Like saying, e.g., "there are different kinds of human(ity)". Starts innocent, but it opens a dangerous door.

Thanks for the clarification. I agree that the categories we put on "styles" are constructed, but not sure that for me it follows that they don't "exist". For example after I shared this discussion with a friend, we talked about how the "wall of text" of Hacker News' UX was jarring to them and they much preferred a Pinterest-style UX, while I like the information density of HN (and Slashdot, and lobste.rs, and Reddit, and ...). To me it seems like this difference in our preferences certainly exists; and it feels like "style" is an okay word for it. Although of course "style" is usually thought of as generalized, which can be problematic.

So, I'll think more about it ... My initial reaction is that like gender (which I also see as constructed) it's still a useful concept, although you have to be careful with it, but like I say, worth pondering.

> knowledge that reflects the particular perspectives of the subject

I.e., a typical postmodernism. Not anywhere near any real science.

The problem here, is that when one wants to understand how scientific progress is made, the particular perspoectives of the subjects (a.k.a. current implicit and explicit understandings of scientists) is the matter for research.

Postmodernism has its place, also in 'real' science.

> when one wants to understand how scientific progress is made

Kuhn covered it in full. Nothing more to be said on this subject.

> the particular perspoectives of the subjects

Which is perfectly covered by well-grounded, tested and entirely scientific anthropology methods. No postmodernism whatsoever.

> Postmodernism has its place, also in 'real' science.

Postmodernism goes much further than simply acknowledging that a personal perspective may affect a pace of knowledge acquisition (but not the final outcome of it).

Postmodernism introduces an outrageous idea that a personal perspective is just as valuable as an objective knowledge, and some (with the so called feminists being among the worst) even go further and ditch the objective knowledge altogether.

> Kuhn covered it in full. Nothing more to be said on this subject.

The book was a classic when it came out, but there have been some fairly strong critiques in the past fifty years or so.

In fact, the most recent edition of the book includes a 'Postscript' written in 1969, in which Kuhne tries to answer some of the most pertinent criticisms of his theory.

There are also alternative theories to all this, or at least different perspectives one can take. Karl Popper's Conjectures and Refutations is a good example.

This stuff seems very gender studies specific?

Not that there is anything wrong with that.

Well, it is called feminist philosophy of science :) But while it comes from a gender perspective, feminist standpoint theory and situated knowledges are more general, really looking at the interaction between dominant and marginalized groups. "Starting from Marginalized Lives", an interview with Sandra Harding, has some good perspectives on this. http://jaconlinejournal.com/archives/vol15.2/hirsch-starting...

If I can summarize, the main distinction between feminist philosophy and normal epistemology is that feminists don't seem to believe in objective reality.

Most standard epistemologies believe there is an objective reality X, and we humans can make observations o(X) and then infer facts about X. E.g., a Bayesian will then use Bayes rule to compute P(X | o(X) ) = P( o(X) | X) P(X) / P(o(X)).

From what I can tell, feminists epistemologists reject this idea. They are generally insufficiently formal for me to figure out what they replace it with. For the most part, they don't seem to actually include objective reality (X in my notation) as a variable at all. They discuss whether certain views are gendered, but the correctness of those views plays a minimal role in the theory.

This of course sounds pretty crazy if you apply it to chemistry or physics, so for the most part these theories are simply not applied in those cases.

For feminist philosophers of science like Donna Haraway and Sandra Harding, it's not about rejecting objectivity, but rather about looking at how different perspectives influence what we mean by "objectivity".

Ssndra Harding discusses this in various places, such as her essay "What is Strong Objectivity".

For example, think about a medical study where subjects are primarily male. Do the results in fact represent "objective reality" for the general population?

Or, using your Bayesian example, consider fields that are disproportionately male, and there are gender differences in the observations o(X) that people make. Do the "facts" that are inferred represent "objective reality"?

Your examples are not philosophical at all. Sampling error and parameterized observations are both well known problems in statistics.

At my company, we are putting various checks in to mitigate sampling error, e.g. flagging A/B tests as potentially erroneous when they terminate at non-integer numbers of weeks. Are we somehow doing feminist philosophy?

In your example of gender differences in observations, the correct solution is to parameterize the gender of the observer. I.e., you'd have o_m(X) and o_f(X). This is no different from parameterizing the time since a visitor hit a website in a conversion experiment - a visitor failing to convert after 3 seconds gives you different information than a visitor failing to convert after 3 days. (In this case you'd have o_t(X) instead of o(X).)

The facts that are inferred do, in fact, represent objective reality. They just may not provide a lot of information on it.

How many scientific papers parameterize the gender of the observer?

Does your own work do this?

My own work has never needed to, nor do most scientific papers. Most observations are made by machines. In my current projects they are made by javascript in the browser. In past experiments they were made by things like CCD cameras or MRIs.

I do parameterize other observer properties. For instance, the example of time parameterization is exactly what I'm working on today. Parameterizing space/time in an MRI is an area of active research and is vitally important in the big machines.

> Most observations are made by machines.

... by machines designed and calibrated by men, and interpreted by men.

> In my current projects they are made by javascript in the browser.

... made by code written by a man in a language designed by a man and implemented mostly by men on a platform designed by a man and implemented mostly by men.

So, if you don't acknowledge the possiblity that this could lead to observation biases, then no, it doesn't sound to me like you're doing feminist philosophy.

On the other hand the way you can simultaneously say "the correct solution is to parameterize the gender of the observer" and "my own work doesn't need to and neither do most scientific papers" certainly does seem to clash with the notion of a single "objective reality"!

... by machines designed and calibrated by men, and interpreted by men...made by code written by a man in a language designed by a man and implemented mostly by men on a platform designed by a man and implemented mostly by men.

Are you claiming that if my hit counter were written by a female, in a non-javascript language, then it would yield a different count? Or that if my CCD were designed by a woman, it would take different pictures?

I'm really trying to apply the principle of charity here but I'm failing horribly. So please - I'm shining a laser through a dielectric and imaging the output with a CCD. What bias does feminist philosophy think the gender of the experimentalist introduces? Do the pictures become dimmer? Is noise introduced?

To clarify my position: ordinary statistics has ways of handling observational bias (parameterizing it, averaging it out). I acknowledge that in some experiments this would affect things. I also believe that in the vast majority of experiments (e.g., shining lasers through materials, mixing chemicals together) that these effects are exceedingly implausible and can be safely ignored. Do you disagree with this claim?

> Are you claiming that if my hit counter were written by a female, in a non-javascript language, then it would yield a different count?

I'm claiming that if the experiment that involved a hit counter was designed and implemented by women, in a language designed and implemented by women, running on a platform designed and implemented by women, and the results were interpreted by a woman, it might well lead to a different conclusion about "objective reality".

And I'm suggesting that your unwillingness to acknowledge that possibilty is an indication that you're not doing feminist philosophy.

You seem to be moving the goalposts a lot. First you discussed sampling error and different observers, until I pointed out that these are the province of ordinary stats.

Now you are discussing whether social experiments in an alternate universe might come out different. Of course they might.

I don't claim to be doing feminist philosophy - given how rapidly the definition shifts, how could I possibly know if I am? I certainly do feminist philosophy as per your first definition (worrying about biased samples and observers), and I certainly don't do it as per your second (thinking about alternate universes).

You mean, I seem to you to be moving the goalposts a lot. Earlier in the thread you mentioned that you have a hard time understanding philosophy that isn't presented formally, so maybe some of what's going on here. So, get outside your comfort zone, and try taking a step back and rereading the discussion with the goal of trying to understand, rather than win a debate.

Are you suggesting women would calibrate CCDs a different way? Or that if Brandon Eich was a woman JS would be better or somehow "different" (given the same constraints)?

The idea that someones' chromosomes (or identified gender?) influence the outcome of machines seems like it'd need some rather massive evidence. Is there a short summary of this evidence? And why stop at XY vs XX? Why not include hair colour or other things?

Yes, I'm suggesting that languages designed by women -- and a software world where most languages, platforms, and tools -- would likely have different characteristics. Your assumption that it wouldn't seems to need just just as much evidence as the assumption that it would.

> If I can summarize, the main distinction between feminist philosophy and normal epistemology is that feminists don't seem to believe in objective reality.

Philosophies which dispute whether objective reality exists (or even is a coherent concept) predate feminism by, well, quite a lot.

Sure, but I'd hardly characterize them as "normal epistemology".

Indeed. And guys dismissing things they don't agree with or understand as "not normal" also predates feminism by quite a lot.

I would like to make one general suggestion. If someone says something that doesn't seem to make sense to you, assume that you have misunderstood something rather than assume they have. If after giving them all the benefit of the doubt and sincerely trying to understand their point you still disagree with them -- after making sure you have understood it completely -- only then can you truly argue with their position. Otherwise you're arguing with your own ungenerous notion of ideas that you believe are held by other people (who you happen to disapprove of for other reasons).

Think of it this way: if the other side are truly idiots, then arguing with them is no fun. So, even if they are idiots, even pretending that they're not and giving their arguments a more serious quality than they actually possess would only make everything more interesting, and serve to better define your own views better.

Doing the opposite makes sticking to your guns easy, but not for a very good argument (nor for polishing and pondering your own ideas).

As you have no clue as to what feminists truly claim -- nor, it would appear, any desire to find out -- all of your inputs on the subject are irrelevant. I have said it many times before and I will say it again -- if any of your discussions of feminism does not mention the word power, then you can be absolutely, positively, 100% certain that you have misunderstood its views. A feminist like me sees your text, looks for the word "power", sees that it's missing, and can immediately tell that you're not even in the right discussion. To me, your comments read like "no it isn't red! it's square!"

That someone chooses to analyze a dynamics in the context of power rather than objective reality does not mean that they do not believe in objective reality. It's like discussing an object's color rather than its shape. Yes, I agree, the texts may sometimes be confusing, but none of the various feminist theories are for beginners, and they assume some previous knowledge. There are good reasons to reject feminist epistemology, but they are not the ones you mentioned, and you couldn't have given good ones because you're not interested in the actual argument (again, if the word power doesn't come into play then you can be sure you missed something crucial).

So do the following exercise: take the word power (in its social sense) -- and it doesn't even matter how you think others define it; just give it your own best definition, but make it a good one -- and then argue why power may be relevant in epistemology, and try to do a good job at it. Pretend it's debate club and you've been assigned to argue something you disagree with, but are determined to win nonetheless. I can guarantee that the argument you will have come up with will be much, much closer to the actual one made by feminist epistemologist than what you currently believe their argument is.

I really hope you do it, because that would make your arguments against feminism have real value, and would make arguing with you actually worthwhile. As the stand, your comments sound to me like, “so I heard those ‘physicists’ claim that everything in the universe is made of potatoes, but that can’t be true, because water doesn’t taste like potatoes, so they must be stupid”. It’s like, how do you even respond to that? If an argument sounds so absurd to you that it couldn’t have possibly been made by anyone with a brain, it is safe to assume you have misunderstood what it is, even if the misunderstanding is completely the other guy’s fault. I cannot claim that we feminists are great at communicating our ideas.

I didn't claim feminist epistemology made no sense. I merely claimed it abandons objective reality. You seem to disagree with this, I take it?

The problem is that if objective reality exists, then all accurate beliefs must be nearly identical and all the other stuff can only play a minor role. I.e., two alternate beliefs (regardless of power or anything else) must be nearly identical to each other if they are accurate: |B1 - B2| < |B1 - X| + |X - B2| is the general idea (with B1, B2 being the beliefs and X being objective reality). That's the problem - if you allow objective reality then everything else is anchored near it, preventing anything interesting from happening.

Let me guess, there are mysteries hidden in tomes of knowledge you refuse to cite, and you are also unwilling to state anything formally here? Have fun with that act, I'm sure you are fooling everyone else here.

> then all accurate beliefs must be nearly identical and all the other stuff can only play a minor role

Please, please, try to debate the other side of this. That could be a claim made by feminists (as long as power plays a role). You don't need to read a word about feminist epistemology. Just think of something relating epistemology and power.

I can give you some answers, I really, really can, but it would take a long time. The best way is for you to imagine that a genius you admire, say Einstein or Russel, is the one who came up with feminist epistemology (involving power, of course). Try to imagine what he would say, and it has to be really good and really convincing. In fact, pretend they came up with it together, and that their 1951 paper, Feminist Epistemology: How Power Shapes Knowledge is widely regarded their best work. And remember, it is not a work of science but of philosophy, so like good philosophers, they tried to find their hidden assumptions -- and hidden values -- and challenged them at every turn. The result was a work of such simple brilliance, that has helped a whole generation challenge their assumptions and see knowledge in a new light.

The reason for that is because to understand something profound that is outside your normal mode of thought you must undergo a process, and it has to be voluntary (because it involves truly challenging your assumptions), and is much more crucial than the process required for learning a new fact within your normal mode of thought. But I can guarantee you one thing: the process will be extremely entertaining and extremely satisfying. You will enjoy it (I know because I had to go through it myself, when I decided to study history after finishing my math degree).

You must stop assuming that everyone whom you think you disagree with is an idiot. That is the only way you'll be able to actually understand what they're saying, and only then would your objections -- if still standing -- sound intelligent and pertinent rather than "nah nah nah". Once you do that, I'll gladly fill in the missing pieces to the best of my abilities. If you don't, anything I mention that you don't understand you'll attribute to stupidity, and you'll make every effort not to even try to understand. Since I know that there is no chance in the world that anyone can learn anything if they try their hardest not to, while believing that the speaker is an idiot, I really see no point in me trying. I only have a chance once you have convinced yourself that if there is something that doesn't seem right to you that's because you fail to understand something, so that your impulse is to learn more, not less. And the only way for you to do that is to convince yourself -- even for a short while -- that the other side is really, really smart; smarter than you even, so that you fill the blanks (and there are always blanks) not with stupidities that you attribute to the other side but either with true insight you come up with or with honest questions (instead of taunts presented as questions). There is zero chance of learning anything new otherwise. It would be like trying to teach evolution to creationists. I'm sure you would agree that's a futile task.

As predicted just above: Let me guess, there are mysteries hidden in tomes of knowledge you refuse to cite, and you are also unwilling to state anything formally here?

It would be like trying to teach evolution to creationists. I'm sure you would agree that's a futile task.*

In my experience creationists understand evolution just fine. They don't agree, but they understand. That's why we use formal reasoning - the process of following along is mechanistic and does not require revealed wisdom of the sort you are claiming I lack.

I told you time and again that I have no intention to teach someone who shows every intention of not wanting to learn. You simply repeated my words; I would hardly call that a prediction. However, while my unwillingness to lay forth my "tomes of knowledge" as you call them is understandable (and explicitly stated) in light of your stance, I can't see any good reason why you would still insist on not learning. I have told you that pretty much every thing you attribute to feminism is false, yet you have no interest in learning the actual claims. I cannot fathom why any person of intellect will only take pleasure in taking down arguments made by demented caricatures born of his misconceptions, while fearing to confront the actual arguments (which, he may find out, he actually agrees with!)

What you lack (and it's way more than just a claim at this point) is not wisdom (certainly not of some magical sort) but curiosity. I will match every bit of your formal reasoning, and you will enjoy the process -- I assure you. If mechanistic deduction is your only acceptable mode of thought, that is all that will be required. That brilliant Einstein/Russel paper was entirely written in first-order logic. Hardly a line of prose to it other than the somewhat dry introduction and the surprisingly droll conclusion, neither of which is essential (of course, you would have known that if you had bothered to try). An autistic robot would be convinced. However, a child would not, because as it turns out, children who are preoccupied with their own image have a hard time grasping even logic, formal as it is.

P.S.

I am a bit surprised, however, that you have brought up formal reasoning in this thread which discusses the philosophy of science. You surely know that regardless of how formal your methods are, short of logical inconsistencies, the results of your efforts largely depend on your axioms, which is what philosophy is (also) concerned with. I am not familiar with a formal method for deriving a set of axioms for humans, only informal ones.

This is why good philosophers clearly state their axioms and then follow the logic to the bitter end.

But I'm sure that comparing me to a child will fool everyone here into thinking that you actually did state a clearly defined axiom somewhere.

> But I'm sure that comparing me to a child will fool everyone here into thinking that you actually did state a clearly defined axiom somewhere.

A non sequitur: I compared you to a child because you insist on arguing claims no one has actually made and insist on not trying to understand their claims; you insist on not listening. I have said over and over that I will not "state my axioms" in discussions with you because there is no chance in the world that you will in fact listen. You're not interested in a reasoned argument; you are interested in an argument against claims that you have made up. It is absolutely impossible to have a reasoned argument with someone who intends to misinterpret everything you say. Of course, I could be very, very precise as to reduce any chance of misinterpretation, but that would make my job very tedious and my comments far longer than they already are. I find discussions to be much more intellectually satisfying if each party tries their best to understand the others' arguments -- even if they vehemently disagree with them (of course, I'm not even sure you would disagree; you never bother to try and understand what those arguments are so you can't possibly even know whether or not you disagree with the actual claims). Otherwise, it feels more like third-grade taunts.

BTW, have you stated your axioms somewhere (other than the implied "axiom of the other's stupidity" which is implicitly used in every stage of your arguments like the axiom of choice from hell[1])?

> This is why good philosophers clearly state their axioms and then follow the logic to the bitter end.

If you ever try to actually understand what I'm saying (and that requires willingness and real curiosity) rather than try your hardest not to, I am certain you'll find that I follow this very path.

I will just say again that if the word "power" does not appear in an argument you attribute to feminism, then you can be absolutely certain that that is not the actual argument.

[1]: I would really suggest replacing it with the "axiom of the other's genius" (and I don't mean that the other side never makes mistakes; even geniuses do make mistakes). It is certain to make these discussions more challenging, interesting and intellectually satisfying. And hey, all parties involved (including passive readers) might actually -- god forbid -- learn something rather than just yell at each other!

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