As of 2009, non-military cryptography exports from the U.S. are controlled by the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security. Some restrictions still exist, even for mass market products, particularly with regard to export to "rogue states" and terrorist organizations. [...] custom cryptographic software, and even cryptographic consulting services still require an export license.
You might argue that trying to regulate software to keep it from falling into the hands of terrorists is a fool's errand, and you'd be right, but until 1996 [2] it was illegal to export cryptographic software in the first place.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_th... [2] https://www.eff.org/press/archives/2008/04/21-37
That's a rather uncharitable interpretation. If a state was ordering them to include a backdoor in the next release, their options boil down to either 'include a backdoor' or 'shut down the service'[0]. Implying that a service that chooses the latter is more likely to also include a backdoor doesn't seem justified.
[0] (or 'have the resources for a massive secret legal battle', which may not even be possible depending on the nation state and nature of the order).
If there is now one less security feature to please anonymous (for now) states, how to trust them not including other "features" on their requests? Uncharitable, and a tad paranoiac, as it may be...
Such a heuristic isn't paranoid -- if anything, it's rather credulous (by applying comparatively less scrutiny to services which operate out of the same jurisdiction (one known to serve orders of this type) yet which somehow happily continue operating).
Why not just use signal and skip the special cyanogen version?
https://copperhead.co/android/
Oh, and fun fact. Copperhead OS was initially built on CyanogenMod for device compatibility purposes, but they eventually dumped it for AOSP because CM's code became too complex/insecure.