https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160218/10371233643/yes-b...
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160218/10371233643/yes-b...
If that's not the case, then the whole design of a simple pin combined with a complex device id to form a secure key is not as strong as was thought.
Basically, everyone should now use an alphanumeric password on their phones and not rely on the 10-tries limit or on the exponentially increasing delays.
It's pretty well accepted at this point that Apple is capable of complying with the FBI's request. The big question is whether Apple would be capable of complying with a similar request with a newer iPhone that includes a Secure Enclave.
edit: the "firmware" update is an iOS update that removes the software limitation. SOFTWARE LIMITATION. On newer iPhones it's hardware (secure enclave).
Yes, you can do an firmware update on an encrypted iPhone. It's not full disk encryption. Only user data is encrypted.
The Secure Enclave (in the iPhone 5S and iPhone 6) has a hardware enforced rate limiter that cannot be overridden by a firmware update.
http://blog.trailofbits.com/2016/02/17/apple-can-comply-with...
All we know is that Apple at some point increased the delay. Doesn't mean they can decrease it.
The article states:
"Apple can update the SE firmware, it does not require the phone passcode, and it does not wipe user data on update."
But it does not support this statement in any way. In my experience, it does either require the phone passcode, or it wipes the data. Of course, I have no idea where that requirement is implemented.
It would be easy and sensible to have the secure enclave require the passcode for an update to its own firmware, or erase the keys it holds when applying such an update without the passcode. Apple doesn't say they do it from what I can tell, but it would fit with everything else they do, it's pretty easy to do, and I've seen no indication that it doesn't do this.
[1] https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf (page 5)
What proof is there of this ?
Even reports I've heard from people at the White House believe the newer phones are simply not possible for Apple to compromise.
""" Entering Device Firmware Upgrade (DFU) mode
Restoring a device after it enters DFU mode returns it to known good state with the certainty that only unmodified Apple-signed code is present. DFU mode can be entered manually: First connect the device to a computer using a USB cable, then hold down both the Home and Sleep/Wake buttons. After 8 seconds, release the Sleep/Wake button while continuing to hold down the Home button. Note: Nothing will be displayed on the screen when the device is in DFU mode. If the Apple logo appears, the Sleep/Wake button was held down too long. """
[1] https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
The only question is, does the existing firmware blank the store keys before flashing the new update. I didn't see any indication that it does.
A possible mitigation against the "FBI attack" (which I don't know if Apple has implemented), while still allowing SEP firmware updates, would be to have a simple routine in ROM that the SEP always runs upon boot (before running the SEP firmware blob) to verify that as hash of the firmware blob matches the one previously recorded by the SEP. If it doesn't, it could either wipe and update the hash, or refuse to boot until the previous blob is restored. When updating the firmware normally, the SEP would simply verify the user enters their pin before updating the hash.
Or simply require pin entry (or wipe) for all DFU firmware updates, which seems like a much safer option.
Lots of people felt (IMHO with poor understandings of the situation) that it was, and that a modern iPhone would never be "hackable" by the government in this way. That turns out not to be the case, for the obvious reason that Apple needs to be able to ship modified firmware for the enclave, and that modified firmware can always contain modifications to emit the encryption keys in a way that the original security metaphor wouldn't have permitted.
Basically: people are hanging their determination that "the iPhone is secure from government snooping by technological measures" on a completely unattested fantasy design. The real device almost certainly doesn't work like that, and even Apple hasn't claimed that it does.
I'm not sure it's useful to have a battle of hypotheses and assumptions couched in the language of confidence and certainty.
But even on the technical side, my point was stronger: the fact that the enclave firmware was just updated to behave differently without wiping the data that it controls argues very (very!) strongly that the "snoop-proof" feature you believe exists... doesn't.
The fact that the enclave firmware can be seamlessly updated while in an unlocked state is not evidence that the enclave firmware can be seamlessly in a locked state.
http://blog.trailofbits.com/2016/02/17/apple-can-comply-with...
It's claim that the Secure Enclave is comprimisable is based on Apple releasing a firmware update that "increased delays between passcode attempts". From this the author then assumes that Apple then has the ability to "disable passcode delays and auto erase". There is no evidence for this. And there are plenty of other scenarios like their being a hardware minimum attempt delay, auto erase not being possible or the maximum attempt count implemented in hardware.