BMW are sending their software updates unencrypted
shkspr.mobi
shkspr.mobi
This is essentially the same way that most Linux distros update: the data is not protected in transit (although with modern SSL being cheap both on servers and money, it ought to be), but integrity is preserved (assuming a trusted key distribution channel plus assuming the signatures are checked before install, and an update would only install with a valid signature).
In other words, if a malicious payload is signed with Alice's legitimate key, transit security is irrelevant: you're getting a malicious payload anyway. Proving that the private key is only in the hands of legitimate user is hard, and proving it's being used legitimately borders on the impossible (scenario: Alice signs a malicious update while Mallory holds a gun to her head; how do you find out from the signature? I don't think this signature scheme has duress codes). The only thing you can do is revoke the key - but how do you distribute the revocation to the vehicles?
However, this still prevents J. Random Crook from walking by your car with a USB stick and an unsigned malicious update (or serving you an unsigned malicious update while you're downloading it via his MITMed connection).