Mozilla Debates Whether to Trust Chinese CA
freedom-to-tinker.com
freedom-to-tinker.com
For what it's worth, it's not in the default ubuntu list, but you are using Firefox, it's in there...
If any other government's military got a root cert installed, you better believe we'd be hearing about it.
Verisign's incompetence is secondary. (The whatever that Verisign (I'm guessing) has the ability to sign .mil is not lost on me.))
https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/3182
One of the things I've had to do when dealing with DoD networks on the client side is install the root certificates from a site, like:
for example, something like the way ssh records and flags keys, so that you are warned if the certificate you have received, while validated, has changed from what you had received previously?
there would be false positives on expiry, but perhaps they could be flagged as such anyway.
would this help, or am i missing something? obviously it's only going to work if interception is the exception rather than the rule. and it only addresses eavesdropping - it doesn't do anything to stop china implementing some kind of firewall that refuses ssh connections for non-local certs, for example.
The Chinese government can now man-in-the-middle any SSL connection from a browser that has their cert. Be it at a café in the U.S. (by having an agent sitting along side you) or any connection that goes through a router they control.
In case you didn't know, this has already been the case for the U.S. government, the Taiwanese government, etc. because SSL root certs (at least the ones in your browser today) know no boundaries.
SSH is secure because presumably you know when a certificate should be changing and are suspicious otherwise. Today's browsers don't warn you when a the root cert for a domain changes, but they could.
It sounds a bit silly when you put it into words and read it.