Ron Rivest: Keys Under Doormats – Mandating Insecurity [video]
youtube.com
youtube.com
The only point I think it's worth adding to those in the talk (which may be covered in the original paper) is one of temporal trust. That is, even if you manage to convince yourself that there could be a way to safely solve the technical problems of setting up exceptional access in the current world, and you decide that all LE agencies that get access are currently trustworthy, and you believe that other issues such as LE agency corruption and spying are currently minimal to non-existent, There is no way to ensure that this "ideal" (and somewhat naive) world will continue into the future.
I think any person or government that tries to argue that exceptional access is a good idea either hasn't considered historical precedent, hasn't thought the situation through to it's logical conclusion, or is being deliberately disingenuous.
For example, it would be a lot harder to argue that there is a national security risk in legislation that only mandated exceptional access to the crypto used in consumer-level phones. Law enforcement, business, etc gets real crypto with the excuse "why would a business owner be a terrorist?" or similar nonsense.
> deliberately disingenuous
At a minimum, this has to be the case for the people that were arguing against encryption since the first crypto war.