Tech Startups Choose to Stay Private in I.P.O. Standoff
nytimes.com
nytimes.com
I'm skeptical. Simply put, the liquidity that comes with the public markets is a huge advantage - IF your company has its financial act together, otherwise, the scrutiny offsets the liquidity advantage.
The history of financial markets is littered with examples where secrecy leads to wild overvaluations at best and fraud at worst.
Instead of hypothesizing that we've entered a magical golden era where private markets provide all the financing but never require exits, it makes more sense to assume there is an epic amount of confusion, misguided expectations, and in some cases outright fraud. Every single financial cycle in history has witnessed these behaviors. Every. Single. One. Today's Silicon Valley is no different.
In short, for all these great companies out there... How do you really know how they're doing financially? Do they even know how they're doing? Where's the evidence? Without audited books in compliance with GAAP, who can tell?
but, like you said - we just don't know, and it appears they don't want us to know. and that makes me think: in general if someone is keeping something from the public, what are the chances its good vs. bad? I'd say it skews to the latter =)
Sometimes, it's justifiable if the company really needs a private period to invest deeply in something the public markets may not understand, but I'd say mostly it's not - the ongoing markdowns by traditional investors is at least one indicator.
Umm, no that's not any where close to how fund accounting works.
Each position is valued independently and then summed up to give the value of hte fund. If the fund accountant can make the case that the private positions are worth more now than they were a month ago then they go up regardless of what the NAV of the fund is.
Similarly if the fund believe that their private positions are worth less then they get marked down, again independent of what the fund's worth.
I mean, by your logic if the fund holds a public stock that doubled in the past month but the fund went down, then you'd have to mark down the public stock, in this case I'm using a public stock as we know exactly what its worth. Which is absolutely ridiculous.
This is not my logic at all and it makes no sense. Why would the fund need to mark down public stock when the value of that stock is already explicitly known?
The fund's NAV is, by definition, a summation of the values of its holdings. The liquid holdings such as public stocks have clear values that are readily available. Thus any other change in the NAV of the fund would come from its illiquid investments, no?
I agree my comment wasn't exactly correct in that the NAV is a summation of the liquid asset values and estimates of the illiquid asset values, not the other way around as I perhaps implied. But what I mean is that the valuation process for illiquid assets is difficult and imprecise and the valuation committee will naturally tend to assume that the value of illiquid equities generally move with the rest of the market in the absence of other new information. It would take a strong conviction in your illiquid investments to say that they maintained their value while nearly all of the liquid investments lost 10%, 20%, etc.
There's a similar perverse incentive keeping the valuations up - there are a lot of VCs out there but the few really good big startups have their pick of who to get to invest so the other VCs get to fight over so so companies and if one is investion at a 500m valuation then another that is being left out will be tempted to offer to invest at a 1bn valuation to out bid them. After all it's other people's money and they get a percentage on funds under management. If they don't bid up and don't 'invest' then that's less funds.
I recently looked at some terms and conditions on being a 'limited partner' which basically means an investor in a fund and they were taking something like 20% in fees spread over a few years. It's probably a good deal less for larger investments but even so any VC that can persuade investors to put $200m into some company probably gets to pocket quite a few million regardless of how iffy the investment may be.
As the old saying goes: Ain't nothing that price won't fix.
tech companies are not going public because
1. They don't have to (they can raise just as much $$ in the private markets with far less scrutiny) and
2. Going public is a huge pain that most people want to avoid (reporting, quarterly (read: short-term) goals, public scrutiny).
Also, a bunch of other reasons, but that seems like the two most well-known factors that for some reason are not mentioned at all in the article..unless I'm missing something.
The article hints that the market's poor reaction to recent IPOs is a major factor, but I'd say it's less than the two I mentioned above, though I can't quantify that here.
“Volatility has bred more practical thinking, especially on the shareholders’ side,” said Atish Davda, the chief executive of EquityZen, a marketplace for pre-I.P.O. companies.
Only a third of the tech companies that went public last year are in the green today, meaning that many initial offering investors are already feeling some pain in their portfolios and are unwilling to take on new risk.
It's not that there's no companies who want to go public, it's the investors who want to see solid revenue, more liquidity, and better business plans before letting these companies risk their money.
> Since 1993, when the firm started collecting data, tech intial offerings have been absent from only three quarters: the third quarter of 2002, the first quarter of 2003 and the first quarter of 2009.
Having liquidation event language in mezzanine rounds of funding isn't that new.
I'm now wondering how long it will be until we see language that penalizes a company if it doesn't have a liquidation event in a certain time horizon in its series A or B rounds of funding.