Both Munger and Buffett have a habit of stealing your wallet while telling you you're an idiot for letting them do it. The article and the Goldman deal are reflections of that attitude.
Both Munger and Buffett have a habit of stealing your wallet while telling you you're an idiot for letting them do it. The article and the Goldman deal are reflections of that attitude.
You'd hope someone like Buffet, with his cache and savvy could suggest some reasonable ways to end "too big to fail." All things right now make me think we'll have another bust in a couple years, nothing is fundamentally different.
The Goldman warrants are an option to purchase an additional $5 billion of stock at $115 per share, any time in the next 5 (now 4) years. Basically, they're a plain vanilla call option.
What's really interesting about those warrants is that they behave identically to an equity purchase, only without the downside. Berkshire literally can't lose money. Plus, if the warrants are ever exercised, then Berkshire simply gets more equity. It never gets tarted up with default swaps and tranches and triggers and all that crap. The deal is the complete opposite of the 'casino' mentality that Munger is decrying.
So, yeah, you might be technically correct. However, you've also got to look at the spirit of the thing.
No. They were derivatives. Goldman was to pay those heavy dividends by executing credit default swaps they had purchased from AIG. Trouble is, the securities underlying the swaps were overcommitted, meaning the swap prices would be driven way down in an open market. And Goldman didn't own the securities. And the securities hadn't necessarily defaulted. And AIG had no money.
This was solved by the Munger/Buffet helping arrange for the taxpayer to pay off AIG's gambles at 100% without Goldman even delivering the securities underlying the swaps.
Make no mistake, the Goldman deal was a naked derivative play combined with brazen government corruption.
However, my understanding was that from Berkshire's perspective, it was a straight equity investment for preferred stock. They didn't really care where the dividend cash came from, so long as they got paid. So, if it was a derivative play, it was an indirect one. Berkshire never had those default swaps on its books.
That's how I remember it going down, at least. It's entirely possible that I got some of this wrong.