Mapping the US nuclear war plan for 1956
blog.nuclearsecrecy.com
blog.nuclearsecrecy.com
Given that many US weapons weren't even one-point safe until the 80s, and I doubt Soviet weapons were better, and there were a fair number of routine accidents with those weapons, there must have been some undisclosed policy of secretly keeping the weapons even less ready than has ever been reported, or we've been unbelievably lucky. (If I could have been completely certain it would remain secret, deploying primarily inert weapons (just replace the HEU with lower enriched uranium, or for plutonium weapons, even just screwing up the lensing) would have been very tempting. If you believe in MAD, then really only deterrence has any value; the retaliatory value in reality could be forgone.)
It would also account for why weapons were never used intentionally post WW2 -- if you knew your arsenal actually was disabled, you'd bluster even more but never use it.
We were 1 key press away from Armageddon. The article talks about why the USA declassified this. Well Russia stole a lot of info and they probably had it already so might as well release it. It looks doable to citizens so they feel patriotic.
http://www.amazon.com/One-Minute-Midnight-Kennedy-Khrushchev...
I imagine there was also a great desire to err on the side of caution. If they underestimated Soviet strength, they'd be risking the survival of the nation. If they overestimated Soviet strength, they'd just be in a great position if war broke out.
Considering it's taken more than 300,000 years to grow this one, there's no guarantee anything equivalent would appear again.
That and the courage of many people at all levels who chose not to escalate incidents into situations where war would be inevitable.
Russians wouldn't want to advertise their weakness. Kazaks (in this scenario) wouldn't want to advertise that they cooperated with Americans. And USA wouldn't want to advertise how easy it was to steal a warhead and sell it for a relative pittance.
In a few decades, I think we're going to hear some interesting horror stories of the post-Soviet years, similar to the early '80s near-Armageddon scenario of the Soviet false alarm that wasn't published at the time (the Stanislav Petrov incident).
[1]: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB491/
[2]: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09...
[3]: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Plutonium%20Mounta...
[4]: https://www.reddit.com/r/askscience/comments/4hh0h7/does_mod...
edit: formatting, one more link
Well, do we really know?
They basically had enriched uranium just hanging around in a drafty warehouse that had a simple padlock on the door, with an underpaid guard to keep an eye on things.
> Altogether, the team discovered 1,032 containers in the warehouse, and each had to be methodically unpacked, examined and repacked for transport into quart-sized cans that were then inserted into 448 shipping containers—55-gallon drums with foam inserts—for the flight. Laborious checking was necessary, each can compared with the Ulba handwritten logs. In the end, the Americans discovered several canisters lying in the warehouse without dog tags. Some of the uranium had to be heated in special ovens to remove water to facilitate the repacking.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Danube_%28nuclear_weapon%...
There's a number of questions that were raised in this work that the author mentions, and I'll list them here:
- What was the rationale for picking targets? - Why does it appear that U.S. planners went for such amazing overkill?
The year provides a clue, and an important context: In the 50s, the strategy was "Massive Retaliation". WWII ended 11 years prior. The Soviets had a massive army in Eastern Europe, and the Korean War had ended only 3 years earlier, confirming many people's fears that the Soviets were willing to implement Communism by force. Given that the Western Powers had no hope of conventionally halting a Soviet attack on Europe, the plan called for an immediate escalation to nuclear weapons; which were the only credible threat to Soviet ground forces at that time.
The other important context is that while this is a full target list, it isn't a /plan/. And that was because there wasn't a plan yet. Air Force targets overlapped Navy ones, and early doctrine called for simply attacking everything should hostilities begin. This was changed in 1961 with the Single Integrated Operations Plan, which for the first time was a single plan with no only a target list, but different escalation options, assignments to various services for who struck what and when, and a much clearer rationale. It was a vast improvement over the "simply hit everything vital" days of Massive Retalitation.
On the subject of overkill, it's also useful to point out that it was not expected that all warheads would reach their targets. the ICBM was in it's infancy, and SLBMs (submarine launched) did not yet exist. The B-52 had only just entered service; the mainstay of SAC rode on the B-47. Nuclear Weapons were large, sometimes unreliable, unwieldy things. In many ways, the target list was wishful thinking.
Some good reading: If you read only one, read this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single_Integrated_Operational_...
Can you elaborate? Wouldn't the Korean War confirm the West was willing to stop Communism by force, even against the will of the majority of the people in the target country? (Of course, both things can be simultaneously true).
Without deconstructing this too far, I would say that the Korean War began with North Korea invading South Korea. A U.N. resolution followed which authorized the use of force to respond.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War
My best understanding is how I described it.
The Korean War was the outcome of previous events -- it cannot be seen in isolation. How do you suppose the Koreans, as a people, saw the division of Korea imposed by both the US and the Soviet Union on them? What was the charismatic leader in the South that would have unified all of Korea in general elections? Say free elections were held -- true, non fraudulent elections -- and a communist government won... what do you suppose the US would have done?
What about this, from the same Wikipedia article you linked to?
> Appointed as military governor, General Hodge directly controlled South Korea as head of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK 1945–48) [...] The USAMGIK refused to recognize the provisional government of the short-lived People's Republic of Korea (PRK) because it suspected it was communist.
The US and Western powers were totally unwilling to let Korea fall to communist hands, whether it was by force or otherwise, and were willing to use force to prevent it. What I'm saying is hardly controversial and was the US foreign policy for much of the Cold War.
Also they weren't planning on bombing Tyumen (the oil capital). Probably wasn't as important then. Still tt's funny how you can have several thousands dots and miss some essential ones.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Tidal_Wave
For another example, a large part of the motivation behind Japan's attack in December 1941 was the US embargo on oil exports to Japan. (The embargo in turn was motivated by Japan's rampage in China; I don't mean to imply Japan was in any way justified here, just that this was a major reason.)
As for why this particular target isn't included, I'd guess that either the lists are incomplete, it was just missed by the planners, or perhaps oil production wasn't considered to be worth targeting because the war would be over so quickly.
See Daniel Yergin's The Prize, or Robert Newman's "A Brief History of Oil".
https://www.worldcat.org/title/prize-the-epic-quest-for-oil-...
Did they have exact latitudes and longitudes, or just names of the places?