> A Ring -3 rootkit was demonstrated by Invisible Things Lab for the Q35 chipset; it does not work for the later Q45 chipset as Intel implemented additional protections.[39] The exploit worked by remapping the normally protected memory region (top 16 MB of RAM) reserved for the ME. The ME rootkit could be installed regardless of whether the AMT is present or enabled on the system, as the chipset always contains the ARC ME coprocessor. (The "-3" designation was chosen because the ME coprocessor works even when the system is in the S3 state, thus it was considered a layer below the System Management Mode rootkits.[32]) For the vulnerable Q35 chipset, a keystroke logger ME-based rootkit was demonstrated by Patrick Stewin.[40][41]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Active_Management_Techno...
A nice overview of what AMT and ME is capable of (and has been for the past decade) can be found in libreboot FAQ:
seriously, AMT is stuff of nightmares. runs even when machine is powered off.
Biggest irony: they advertise it as a feature for IT management. ;)
The other thing that's even stranger is Absolute Software, a little company nobody has ever heard of who somehow got every OEM to bundle their code in system BIOS for theft recovery since the 90s.
It seriously reads like a botnet description. I'd have believed them if they said "From the innovators behind Storm comes new endpoint protection..."
You can do some wacky shit with it. There is one mode where you can configure it to delete certain directories or files to screw around with a thief. That can be tweaked to delete files that the system needs. Those modes are persistent, and even after reformatting or replacing the boot media, the agent will reinstall and retrieve its policy file.
If you use it with Intel AMT, it can also brick the device permanently. (http://www.intel.com/content/dam/doc/product-brief/mobile-co...)
Everyone who tested the product had two questions: "Who is buying this?" and "How do I get this dormant code off my devices?"
Laptops aren't cheap, but they aren't expensive enough as an asset to care that much about recovery. And there are arguably better ways to safeguard data assets.
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/6073/02Mar_An...
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10906999
Basically, modern SOC's are mixed-signal systems that have digital, analog, and often RF capabilities. I've imagined, with limited HW knowledge, quite a few attacks on digital subsystems using analog or RF components. HW gurus I know encounter sneaky stuff like that in 3rd party I.P. regularly and have to mitigate it. Most people have no clue it exists. They're mitigating at the networking channel which is a mere abstraction for more complex stuff going on in chip and interface point. You could even embed a radio in the sucker that turned on when it detected a certain signal in a packet header that NIDS certainly wasn't analyzing.
Note that NSA TAO catalog includes active attacks with radars that rely on physical materials in counterfeit parts and SOC's with embedded radios hidden in USB connectors. Quite a few attacks at SOC level software people will never see coming.
Nope, I'm talking about scale. You'd need to signal (paint with radar, send a packet, dip the power in morse code, put the magic cookie in the root DNS server response, whatever) every target at least once prior to exploitation. But yes, stealth would certainly be a concern that would reduce the value of AMT relative to a factory backdoored RNG.