I think most languages these days are a bit smarter and avoid this beginner mistake (for various reasons).
I think most languages these days are a bit smarter and avoid this beginner mistake (for various reasons).
The only way this is 'solved' is if some third party authority hands out top level names and refuses to register names that are similar to other names for some definition of similar. The number of levels between top level and package name is irrelevant.
While attacking a single package would be possible, covering any interesting amount of "typo"-space would require registering huge amounts of namespaces.
If package manager developers are smart, the allocation of namespaces is also handled externally and associated with some cost (e. g. domain names).
Therefore these kinds of attacks become impractical.
Package managers like these approach social networks, which has many advantages but carries the disadvantage of opening users to attacks that resemble social network phishing attacks. We could mitigate this by rolling back to package managers with higher barriers to entry, but I think that is not likely to happen.
You clearly would prefer to use a more adjudicated, managed package manager, with a higher barrier to publish and stronger rules about naming. That's a reasonable thing to want, but it would be better of you if you didn't act like people who want something which conflicts with that goal are stupid.
There's another solution (like debian does), auditing what the package itself does, so that you don't allow malicious code into the repository.
That's something that can be flagged for manual review before it gets too far.
but if you are targeting a package `someuser/popularpackage` can you not just register your own malicious `popularpackage` under a typo namespace like `smoeuser`?
They can see someone registering popular package names under something with a similar namespace and can flag them for manual review (which can be done for namespace-less packages, but there will be much more noise), they can apply things like "This is the first time you are installing a package from 'smoeuser' would you like to continue?", or even require adding a specific namespace "out of band" depending on how paranoid it wants to be.
> "This is the first time you are installing a package
> from 'smoeuser' would you like to continue?"
You don't need package namespacing for this. All package repositories already require a registered account to publish a package.And unless the account name of the package maintainers is brought front-and-center, you aren't necessarily going to know it shouldn't be different until it's too late.
I. I've installed anything from the author "foo" before
on this machine, implying that I trust "foo".
A. On a system with namespaced packages, I attempt to
install "fpp/bar". I've never installed anything
from the author "fpp" before, so I get a prompt.
B. On a system without namespaced packages, I attempt
to install "bsr".
1. If "bsr" is by an author I trust, then it will be
installed. This will be confusing, but is not a
security vulnerability. because this author is
already running code on my machines.
2. If "bsr" is by an author I don't trust, then I get
a prompt, as in scenario I.A.
II. I've never installed anything from the author "foo"
before on this machine.
A. On a system with namespaced packages, I attempt to
install "fpp/bar". The system prompts me, as in
scenario I.A., but because I expect this prompt I
don't bother reading it and blindly accept it. The
prompt does reiterate the name of the author, but if
I didn't catch the typo the first time, there's
little chance I'll catch the typo this time.
Remember: the value of the prompt is not the
reiteration of the name, it's in its unexpected
nature, because research has repeatedly shown
that users, even power users, do not bother
reading routine prompts (this is why, e.g., Chrome
no longer allows users to bypass the enormously
scary warning page that appears when a secure site
has a certificate error). My system gets owned.
B. On a system without namespaced packages, I attempt
to install "bsr". The system prompts me, as in
scenario I.A., but because I expect this prompt I
don't bother reading it and blindly accept it. My
system gets owned.
A more complete version of the solution that you're proposing would be to have an actual implementation of a web of trust, but even that doesn't solve all the security problems inherent to package repositories.