I seem to remember that being a "Feature" of a desperate SourceForge not to long ago.
I believe the average HN reader - including you - should be interested in this then: https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/4n3e1s/the_state_...
That said, I'm one of those people who bothers to check the signatures on binaries before installing them, so as long as I trust the signature and dev, doesn't much matter to me if I downloaded it from xxx-malware-binaries.biz.ru.
Even if they were bought out by RMS himself, I'd never host any of my projects there.
It's just something I don't think I'll ever support after what happened; it's a matter of principle.
For an example: IBM made a brand of laptop called ThinkPad. Now Lenovo makes a brand of laptop called ThinkPad. IBM's ThinkPads were excellent; Lenovo's ThinkPads are average. They're two different products, produced by two different companies, that happen to share a brand because one company sold that brand to the other. The brand conveys absolutely no information about whether you should trust the product. The company owning the brand conveys 100% of the information.
No employees came along with the brand? None of the decisionmakers responsible for the previous SourceForge derp over the past couple of years? It's a clean slate - tabula rasa? That's fine, but it'll take time for people to warm up to that idea. That's what happens when you abuse trust.
The brand is tarnished in my mind.
If you have both information about a "brand", and information about the actual group or individuals underlying it, giving any weight to the brand will give a suboptimal result and let people exploit you. The reputational information has some value, but only if you have no "observational" information. Trying to use them both together is double-counting. Just use the information about the individuals and throw the brand information away.
In in other words, basically http://lesswrong.com/lw/lx/argument_screens_off_authority/, but with a more generalized halo effect in place of "authority."