Hypervisors offer decent security and performance guarantees, which means they are good for sharing resources among potentially hostile customers. Their simple resource semantics and small ABI makes for a fairly secure abstraction.
LPARs/LDOMs are a much more secure abstraction for "sharing resources among potentially hostile customers". Those physically partition at the hardware. LPARs are used on the IBM mainframes and are "EAL5 Certified". LDOMs are the SPARC equivalent, but I do not know their EAL. Both traditional kernels and various hypervisors are EAL 4 (some are called EAL4+), which is not as secure.
In a unikernel setup abstractions can live much more comfortably in libraries.
Protection profile less CC evaluations are worthless in the eyes of most governments and CC schemes, but kudos to IBM product management and marketing for creating competitive FUD.
As of a year ago LDOM's (Oracle VM for SPARC) hasn't had a CC evaluation and I'm not seeing anything currently in evaluation. Solaris Zones have been evaluated under the Solaris OSPP EAL4 + extensions evaluation.
The biggest reason that virtualization technologies haven't had a CC evaluation with a protection profile is that no US NIAP approved protection profile existed and the draft ones that were circulated were crap.
Assurance levels (EAL) are deprecated for newest NIAP protection profiles as the higher assurance levels (EAL4) were cost and time prohibited for vendors to complete before the product was outdated. Many people wrongly think common criteria is a security evaluation (free of bugs) - it's not - it's a security architecture evaluation (is the documented behavior working correctly).
There is a schism in CC - everything is changing - anything we know today is wrong and will change.
TL;DR: Common Criteria is a joke and doesn't actual mean what you think it does.