However, it's designed around a simplified threat model. In spiped, you use pre-shared keys (the same key on client and server), that "somehow" you got a copy onto both systems without anyone seeing them. But you can't just drop your key into a mobile app binary, submit to the app store, and expect people not to reverse-engineer it and start reading other people's traffic. So now you need to figure out how to derive spiped keys on a per-session basis in a cryptographer-approved way™ and distribute them securely and verify the key someone told you to use is not actually from the NSA, and then on top of that think about perfect forward secrecy and certificate pinning and various other "beyond TLS" guarantees.
There are solutions to all those problems, tarsnap ships really cool solutions, but we are not talking about spiped anymore, we're talking about spiped and a long list of other things, and the other things are easy to get wrong if your name is not cpervia.
Another practical problem with spiped is the performance degrades for small messages. This doesn't matter if your use case is doing backups, but if your use case is "I typed the letter 'c' in the search bar and where are my search results? I thought this was supposed to be a performance technology" it matters a LOT.