No, I do not. Unfortunately that's no guarantee they're not around though :(.
All the data on this is extremely old and no one seems to recently have done a deep-dive into Go's TLS stack. I really hope someone will (or that Google will fund the research themselves). It would be beneficial to the ecosystem to have a thoroughly reviewed implementation and a clear understanding of what the state is.
Right now all I can go on is a statement of the author about 3 years ago, around the time of Go 1.2:
Cryptography is notoriously easy to botch in subtle and surprising ways and I’m only human. I don’t feel that I can warrant that Go’s TLS code is flawless and I wouldn’t want to misrepresent it.
There are a couple of places where the code is known to have side-channel issues: the RSA code is blinded but not constant time, elliptic curves other than P-224 are not constant time and the Lucky13 attack might work. I hope to address the latter two in the Go 1.2 timeframe with a constant-time P-256 implementation and AES-GCM.
Nobody has stepped forward to do a review of the TLS stack however and I’ve not investigated whether we could get Matasano or the like to do it. That depends on whether Google wishes to fund it.
https://blog.golang.org/a-conversation-with-the-go-team
I've also had a discussion with one of the Caddy developers who recommended for production usage to front it with something that does TLS for you, precisely because no one really seems to know the state of TLS in Go. Arguably other TLS implementations have other issues but there's something to be said for "the devil you know".