What about abuse of the person bearing the eyeball while still attached and living. Have a second camera verify the whole picture, the number of persons involved etc.
What about coercion via phone and internet?
What about "this was never a good idea." Can't remember where I read this, but biometrics are a username, not a password!
My answer is the same as with most "whaddabout... " questions with biometrics: consider the threat model. How likely is it that you'll run into someone who would threaten you with bodily harm to get you to unlock a phone with your retina but wouldn't do the same thing if you had a passcode? Not very.
So, this proposal improves on security for at least one scenario, while being no worse at another - that's an improvement. Don't succumb to the Nirvana fallacy.
The only case in which biometrics can be considered secure is when the biometric scanner is paired with an armed guard.
So Doomguy's "mash the corpse's head into the bioscanner" trick won't actually work in the future?
Even if the pupil dilation response to light is not consistent over time (or affected by drinking/stress), wouldn't the mere fact that it responded at all be proof of a living eye?
Someone could play a video
But a video would have the characteristics of a photograph rather than a physical eyeball, so the other techniques used to try and detect photographs from eyeballs would catch the video.