OpenBSD binpatches and package updates
stable.mtier.org
stable.mtier.org
Some people wanted bin-patches apparently, openbsd is heavily focusing on using its resources as efficiently as possible and doesn't provide them, a reliable 3rd party stepped up providing them for free, charging for binpatches for older versions (a service model built on top of open source software, nothing wrong with that)
A few points:
-) since mtier here tries to basically sell you something, they make it sound harder than it seems, checking the errata page, writing a 20 line script to get notified if the page is updated, that's enough
-) not every bug found is critical towards your own security, not every bug does need you to update (you can decide on an individual basis)
-) micro-managing (as one comment stated) is pretty much the opposite of what you do with openbsd, openbsd is secure by default, if you want to have anywhere near the same amount of security with some other OS have fun reading tons of documentation to harden the box yourself (and you still won't have all the same security mitigations)
-) updates are trivial: update, re-compile, reboot, if the bug is not critical for you then don't, or use -current (rolling release "development branch"), or use the bin-patch by mtier
-) I doubt some of the people here criticising "having to use" 3-rd party binpatches practice the same scrutiny in day-to-day life regarding it-security (seeing how other OSs deal with security they would probably be using openbsd by now then if they were)
-) considering the size of the openbsd project and how many critical pieces of security-focused utilities they maintain (openssh, libressl, opensmtpd, ...), how many security mitigations they implement, how well they do in regularly auditing their code and actually addressing bugs across multiple architectures quickly with patches provided (especially compared to so many so much larger projects), it's somewhat ridiculous for an outsider to criticise how they spend their time or resources (because in my opinion and in the opinion of many others, they actually do hell of a great job!)
Repeating "secure by default" seems rather disingenuous when a freshly-installed system needs extra attention, and cannot automatically fetch the latest security updates.
Updates may be "trivial" to you, but they are still clearly more complex than the average system, as they require individual attention and recompilation. These speedbumps to security are not what "secure by default" implies.
Alternatively, relying on a third-party tool (and having to vet that extra party) is not "secure by default" either.
Your final points are distracting from the issue and verging on ad-hominem. Firstly, first-party binpatches are so prevalent that noticing their absence is hardly significant scrutiny. Secondly, just because OpenBSD is very good in some areas doesn't mean we can ignore deficiencies in other areas.
But your original comment was: "Does it seem a little embarrassing to anyone else that this is necessary? OpenBSD is supposedly the most secure nix platform available, and yet users have to resort to third-parties to get functionality that is available on nearly every other nix system by default."
So no, I don't consider it to be embarrassing for a little project that does so much in so many ways (part of it being that every single security issue is addressed and patched swiftly across multiple architectures, full disclosure is practised et cetera) to not provide binary patches while having an experienced community accepting of this. This last part actually what makes OpenBSD such an efficient catalyst for innovation, since people accept breaking backwards compatibility, turning on security mitigations while it might brake some stuff here and there, et cetera...
For my use case, I set up a dedicated builder VM, have it build a full release, then "upgrade" the other VMs with my local build. Although the installer only officially supports upgrading from version N to N+1, IME it seems to work for N -> N "upgrade" as well. This is workable and not too complicated, but it's definitely not trivial.
That said, to me mtier doesn't provide enough value, either. Prior to me setting up a dedicate builder, I probably would be interested, if they provide support past upstream's support period. 1.5 years is not "LTS" to me.
Maybe I downplayed it a little bit too much, probably can't deny it, but it was in reaction to people making (imo) too big a fuss about it, while criticising a project which - with limited resources and manpower - does an extraordinary job on the whole (as many - myself and most likely you included - could agree on).
A lot of people who utilize OpenBSD like you do most likely have the skill-set to deal with it in a similar manner as you have though, or can pay for commercial support. Thanks again for the insight!
I find it very easy. I follow stable and upgrade every six months. Upgrades take about 30 minutes max.
That is why I say embarrassing - they are one of very few projects to lack this feature, and this feature is an important part of a secure system. OpenBSD is all about being "hands off" and "sane by default" and yet paradoxically their update process is much more involved and hands-on!
I fail to see any downsides to this arrangement.
There aren't enough resources or interested developers willing to handle -stable package builds, but the ports tree is tagged each release and receives select backported security updates, which you can build yourself.
Might I suggest looking into who it is at M-Tier that's producing these packages? It's not just some random third-party.
FWIW, the openup tool makes things extremely easy and it certainly doesn't "involves lots of time". Run "openup -c" from a cronjob and, when you get an e-mail saying there are updates available, log in and run "openup". Kick off a reboot if the kernel/base was updated and you're good.
I run several OpenBSD boxes in production. Don't let this be what stops you.
I don't want to seem adversarial, and I want to like openbsd, but it's hard.
Nobody else does this, not even small distributions, and tbh the excuses are really thin - especially for a project so committed to security and transparency.
Most other operating systems are badly run as well. Doesn't mean that adding another layer of potential insecurity is justified.
> Does trusting mtier really make that big a difference?
Yes. Is mtier running similar ship to mint? Do you have convincing argument that they don't?
But if you go with another OS, that's the system you get and you miss out on the nice vulnerability mitigation technologies that are built into OpenBSD. Besides, which harmful thing is more likely to happen, your package repository gets owned, or someone sends a maliciously crafted request to your server?
> Is mtier running similar ship to mint? Do you have convincing argument that they don't?
I have no idea what "running similar ship to mint" means or implies.
If you have ports closed because you run desktop then the former? It's fine do a little admin work (or it be a job of itself) on (production) servers, it's not if you just want to have secure desktop, which was my original complaint. Besides, there are plenty of examples in various projects where downstream got compromised, so why introduce another link that can potentially break.
> I have no idea what "running similar ship to mint" means or implies.
That they shipped infected isos. There are other examples where you'll see brilliant engineers give little to no thought to security, the fact that m:tier guys might contribute great work for openbsd doesn't mean that they can also keep artifacts secure and I as the end users shouldn't have to play sherlock to figure out if I can trust them.
If you don't trust them, then apply the errata yourself and compile from source. It's not that difficult. If you have many machines you can do it on one, build a release and roll that out on the others.
However, it is not ideal to have a security-focused OS not directly provide binpatches for the base system and core libraries like libressl. Trusting OpenBSD.org is one thing, but trusting additional entities like mtier, etc. just to get security updates without having to compile is another.
FWIW, I think we should feel embarrassed about not giving more funding & time to OpenBSD given everything they already do for us.
http://www.openbsdfoundation.org/campaign2016.html
Maybe someone at OpenBSD Foundation should get itself listed at smile.amazon.com and make it even easier for people to contribute.
This is just another convenient option. I fail to see the problem here.
If you want supported first-party binary security patches you should be using a project that provides that, such as FreeBSD, or just about any Linux distro that is not Gentoo.
Additionally, the amount of security patches we're talking about here is so small that just updating from source code really isn't that big of a deal for most people.
Sure, and it really is up to me to keep bitching :)
Besides, the contradiction here is that they are not all volunteers: M:Tier employs some of them exactly to do that job. So, they don't want to do it, but they'll do it if the price is right? Why can't this pricing be done transparently through OpenBSD, rather than some obscure third-party company?
If the problem is funding, why can't they do like RedHat or Oracle, who ask for money to provide automated updates? Oh yeah they do, but through m:tier for some sort of reason (tax? street rep? We can but speculate).
> just updating from source code really isn't that big of a deal for most people.
It's enough to keep the m:tier service running and people like me bitching, so clearly for a lot of people it is. It's enough that every other linux distro out there does it. Denying it over and over won't change that.
So you're begrudging some of the OpenBSD developers for having a day job? That is completely absurd. How are they supposed to feed themselves and their families?
Several of FreeBSD's core developers work for Apple. Red Hat employs a large chunk of the GNU and Linux ecosystems. Red Hat actually does something very similar to what M:Tier does.
M:Tier is really just another example of a company that is providing value added support over the offerings of a freely available open source project. They are even generous enough to provide their openup script under an open source license and binary updates free of charge for the most recent version of OpenBSD. I think that is a pretty good deal for everyone involved.
Au contraire, I begrudge why they have to do their OpenBSD-related day-job, working on what is basically an essential part of any modern OS (update distribution infrastructure), outside of the official project and with no official endorsement. It devalues them, it devalues the project and only invites speculation on the motives of such arrangements.
> Several of FreeBSD's core developers work for Apple.
Do I have to pay an Apple subscription to get automatic FreeBSD updates? No.
> Red Hat employs a large chunk of the GNU and Linux ecosystems
Sure, and I do have to pay to get automated updates from them, but at least I know they are official. M:tier packages are not official but sort-of wink-wink-nudge-nudge. For a project living and dying on trust, it's a poor show.
> M:Tier is really just another example of a company that is providing value added support
Sure, but my point is that OpenBSD is a pretty isolated example of a project that actively refuses to provide what any comparable project provides, with very flimsy excuses. This leaves the space open for m:tier to make a buck that really belongs to the OpenBSD project. IMHO the project (which is otherwise extremely fond of reminding us that they are short of money) gets shortchanged here, even if some individuals might not be.
Well that is because the official and ONLY supported way to patch an OpenBSD system is to compile from source. Like pretty much all of OpenBSD's documentation, the instructions to do so are very clear.
M:Tier provides a service that is merely a convenience. It is not essential and I would suspect that only a small fraction of OpenBSD users even make use of their openup script and binary package updates at all.
I suspect you are being purposely obtuse and cannot understand that the way in which your favorite $OS is not the only right way to do things.
The OpenBSD project has no obligation to provide binary updates. They provide source code patches and clear instructions of how to apply them. This is actually better for security because you can actually see what is being changed by the patch if you know a little bit about programming.
The OpenBSD project actively refuses to provide a service that pretty much any other OS project provides, so that a commercial entity can make a buck, and I am the one being purposely obtuse?
> only a small fraction of OpenBSD users even make use of their openup script
Until it relies on m:tier servers, of course. Why would I have to trust an unrelated company to update a security-conscious OS?
> This is actually better for security
This is actually worse for security because it relies on sysadmins being human robots that constantly check errata, or being faultless programmers who will never botch a hacked-together-enough-that-works custom script to get errata and apply patches. But hey, don't take it from me, hear it from m:tier themselves: "Keeping your installed OpenBSD packages up to date is hard and time-consuming. Nobody wants to read the mailing lists to spot security fixes and/or updates never mind wanting to build new packages from their ports tree and manually install them on each of their servers and/or desktops."
QED.
Following current is pretty simple if you're happy to track snapshots, which are updated regularly (usually every week). If you're worried about stability, remember that -current turns into -stable twice a year, so current is pretty stable, and any issues that do crop up get fixed very quickly, because they impact the developers.