Bungling MS singlehandedly proves that golden backdoor keys are a terrible idea
theregister.co.uk
theregister.co.uk
What's the point of disabling the ability to install another OS?
I can understand having a bit (that you can flip) in the BIOS that prevents accidentally or maliciously overwriting the boot sector of an OS. But what's the point of completely preventing it? What does it accomplish besides neutering the device and pissing off people that are trying to replace the OS?
In practise, MS OSes are evil, easily hacked, and now everyone has the master key.
I'm not saying being able to have signed OS's is a bad idea. What I'm wondering is why isn't this something that the user can enable/disable? Say secured with a long BIOS password.
I'd wager 99.999% of people don't have to worry about evil maid attacks and those that do aren't going to defer to Microsoft's defaults as counter measures.
> Also to prevent attacker from booting into another OS and reading disk content.
Bullshit. If they really want that they can rip out the hard disk. If you don't want people reading your plaintext then don't store it as plaintext. Encrypted disks unlocked at boot is a solved problem.
Having the device default to not booting other OS's unless you go into an unsecured BIOS and flip a bit would cover the majority of cases. All you need is a secure boot path into the BIOS that malware presumably wouldn't be able to replicate from a booted OS.
It is on x86
Secure boot protects against BIOS level root kits and similar low-leve but remote exploitation.
No argument it's a bad idea to use MS's key, instead of the computer's owner. The only explanation for why MS made it this way was for DRM - once again weakening end user security to enforce MS's secure against us.
It comes down to the trusted base concept: once the OS is running, it can provide strong assurances to prevent unauthorized code from running but that can't protect against malicious code starting before the OS. An attacker could use the built-in virtualization support on most modern CPUs to load your normal OS and, with care, make it extremely hard to tell that all of your actions are compromised. Some people like that because it could be used to attack DRM schemes but it could also be used to record keystrokes, steal crypto keys, install ransomware which waits for the user to be utterly hosed before triggering the payment prompt, etc.
Having the firmware verify every bit of code before executing it avoids that problem but that poses the problem of having a trusted signing key which needs to be managed – imagine the mess if, say, Dell's key leaked – and poses the problem of getting new keys on the list for legitimate purposes (e.g. booting Linux) but not making it realistic for malware to do the same thing. I'd like to see some sort of government regulation requiring the latter but having some fairly cumbersome process to complicate social engineering attacks (e.g. reboot while holding down a switch, answer a prompt that you understand this will expose all of your personal data to the new OS, etc.).
This is also why Intel is introducing things like SGX - note the selling points on https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx:
> * Remains protected even when the BIOS, VMM, OS, and drivers are compromised, implying that an attacker with full execution control over the platform can be kept at bay
> * Benefits from memory protections that thwart memory bus snooping, memory tampering and “cold boot” attacks on images retained in RAM
Don't drink their coolaid if they're trying to convince you that they're restricting your freedom in the name of security.
To me the lockdown of windows RT devices does not seem like security motivated at all, considering that secure boot and TPMs in PCs share much of the same security architecture but do allow key swapping. It's more likely motivated by subsidized devices.
That's why your given answer to the question why there is an OS lock-in struck me as coolaid.