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Comment by jb613 | Hacker News Reader

> 2. Don't HPKP your blog. Don't HPKP your cat-sharing starting. Key pinning is a good thing, but it doesn't need to be universally deployed.

Just to be clear, this is equivalent to saying don't bother with SSL for your blog or cat-sharing site (because without pinning someone else can get a cert for your blog/cat-sharing site).

> the ability for sites with low security requirements to opt out of HPKP.

opt out?! It's off by default.

> Remember, the threat model for HPKP isn't fraudsters or trolls; it's state-level adversaries.

Again, by saying HPKP is only for high security sites (now you're saying only for those threatened by state-level adversaries) you are essentially saying SSL is useless for everything less.

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> > the ability for sites with low security requirements to opt out of HPKP.

> opt out?! It's off by default.

I think tptacek meant that a site owner should be able to explicitly declare that nobody should be able to pin a key, so that nobody can hijack the site in the future.

Fine, but take note that leaves the door open for others to get a cert for your domain.

An opt-in would make more sense, since people using HPKP are those that know the most about it. Just like an opt-out, it would have to be via a different channel than HTTP headers.

That's an odd argument to make. You're essentially saying if you can't afford the most secure safe for your jewelry, just put it in a basket in front of your door instead of getting a cheaper safe that keeps most thieves out.

By suggesting HPKP is only for sites worried about nation state adversaries means deploying SSL without HPKP which leaves the door open for adversaries to get a cert issued for your domain.

Right, I don't think you got my point. You don't always need the best option. CAs are far from perfect, but the threat model for a blog or a cat-sharing site is unlikely to include adversaries who are capable of compromising a CA (whether they're nation-state adversaries or not). SSL without HPKP is probably good enough for you in that case. Saying that the traditional CA system without HPKP is as bad as a plaintext protocol is silly.

You are underestimating 1) the number of CA's embedded in your browser, 2) how easy it is to get one of those CA's to issue a cert for someone else's domain.

I think "opt out" means opting out of being able to be pinned, not just choosing not to pin. Instead of pinning a certificate, you might pin "This domain will not be pinning a certificate before $date."

Fine but then you're leaving open the possibility for others to get a cert for your domain.

Not bothering with TLS for a blog is likely to be a good idea.

That's outdated thinking. Look around at the efforts in past ~year for getting SSL everywhere. Non-SSL sites already suffer Google PageRanking[1] (maybe you want Google visibility for your blog or cat-sharing site), other consequences are not far off.

[1] HTTPS as a ranking signal: https://webmasters.googleblog.com/2014/08/https-as-ranking-s...

Well, TLS (allong with access controls) for his sing-along blog would have really helped Dr. Horrible stay ahead of the authorities.

In all seriousness, though, there are plenty of blogs where which page a user visits might, for instance, out a gay teen via gateway logs, hint about a private health issue, etc.

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