Implications of Recent PDF /Launch Hacks
siemblog.com
siemblog.com
(This is intended as constructive criticism, not Internet rage, but I'm open to constructive criticism of my methods for same.)
It's no secret that PDF/Launch can be used to execute an attached binary. Didier's work shows a way to modify the dialog box's contents that ask for the user's approval to launch, giving the attacker the ability to craft a much softer-sounding "ok/cancel" situation or one that is more likely to result in the user allowing the attachment to launch.
As an info-sec guy, and with all the Adobe crap lately, I have to say that the article's author's opinion: "Do you really think the incident response team will suspect every single PDF file on the user’s computer as being involved? I seriously doubt it." doesn't hold much water. I might very likely suspect PDF as the attack vector and would likely refuse to restore these files without taking a much closer look at them.