No thank you.
No thank you.
NOPASSWORD is pretty sane for remote access, my objection would be to any sudo escalation at all on the target.
> What Vuls Doesn't Do
>
> Vuls doesn't update the vulnerable packages.
...ok, so please just stick to stuff like unprivileged sha1sum/dpkg/rpm/stat etc.If vuls absolutely needs some superuser privilege, it makes sense to grant some limited privs via setcap bits (though this would mean it would probably lose the "agentless" feature).
http://askubuntu.com/questions/470383/how-to-avoid-prompt-pa...
But there is a problem with sudo with password via ssh.
For example...
userA .... 'watch w' on serverA
userB ... 'ssh serverA echo sudopassword | sudo -S command'
userA can steal of root password on ServerA because plain sudo password is displayed by w command.So, I disable -ask-sudo-password for security reasons. https://github.com/future-architect/vuls/pull/148
I recommend to define minimum commands in /etc/sudoers on target servers.
CentOS, RHEL
vuls ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/yum, /bin/echo
Ubuntu, Debian
vuls ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/apt-get, /usr/bin/apt-cache
Vuls can scan without root on FreeBSD and Amazon Linux.But the part I'm concerned about is that they seem to think that having password-less sudo is a security win.
I thought they were saying they don't want people's passwords. People reuse them, naive people giving up an actual root password, etc.
Not sure they mean always using NOPASSWORD is good for security.
The pam module requires you to forward a remote connection to your ssh agent - when you connect to a compromised server your attacker can authenticate to other machines as you.
An ssh key for root is simpler and safer.