When I actually went to the Sanlitun embassy area, the closest thing to a riot was a stout Western woman walking her poodle outside the German embassy. Otherwise, it was too hot for anyone to bother go outside and everything was sleepy. The week's worth of rioting on CNN was shot during one day in a well-organized riot properly supervised by the local security officials.
There is no doubt the Chinese were genuinely offended, officials and public alike, but they wouldn't let such a thing cause disorder even though CNN etc. needed the drama.
My personal favorite (heard in Beijing in the early 2000s) was the story that the Chinese military were monitoring the newly deployed American stealth fighters during the Belgrade bombing and had managed to get radar lock on one (or more) of the F-117As from their embassy. The Americans, the story goes, wanted no more of this and bombed the Chinese embassy.
According to The Font of all Knowledge [0] three Chinese "reporters" were killed in what the CIA admitted was its own bombing operation. It has long been common knowledge that the Chinese government uses the Xinhua news agency as a cover for clandestine operatives [1].
True or false, it'still an inventive rumor.
[0] (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_bombing_of_the...) [1] (http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/20/world/in-watching-hong-kon...)
If the background unhappy chatter is close to actionable (or is in the mind of the classifying algorithms), then actionable chatter (eg, actually planning an attack) can only be distinguished from background chatter near when the plans become "active" in some sense, and likely too late to meaningfully respond to. (To use a physics analogy: if you try to predict cavitation in flowing water really close to boiling, it's harder.)
In many senses, simply embracing openly that we're very angry as a society, even in the face of constant scrutiny, prevents that same constant scrutiny from determining when we're planning something. It can only really tell that we're pissed off, in general.
So I wouldn't call it 'by mistake', more like 'by design'.
As for staying off the wires. Thanks to the network effect you need to have a large portion of your network do the same.
The difference was in the number of police man in the coastal cjties. They were non existant which suggests that the regime was fighting in the unrest locations at full capacity. It never happened before.
NGOs. [yet again with silent (dumb?) downvotes in the same comment chain that mentions "network effects".]
OP proposes that staying "off wires" is a remedy. Simple point made is that intelligence agencies have recourse to wide ranging sensory networks, including NGOs (whether complicit or simply surveilled.)
NGOs (even in the case where you're having their help by carrying scanners around for you) aren't within orders of magnitude of the information collected by the average person carrying a cell-phone and tapping the network. You would have to install expensive and complex monitoring equipment over the entire city and install the backend to process it to get even close -- a capability that the US government doesn't have to do everywhere. Which is why they made use of already deployed networks in the first place.
Stopping their passive surveillance strips them of 90% of their power, and NGOs (or other organizations) don't put even a tiny dent in that change.
Which is why many of us were looking for a little more argument than what was given: it's not clear, at all, why either you or the original person thought that NGOs have anywhere near the penetration in to everyday life or surveillance capability that cellphones have.
NGOs tend to have overlapping members and social circles as grassroots organizations. They don't need to gather cell phone signal intelligence, they can just ask their staffers "what do you think of these protests?"
Different threat vector entirely.
My point was exactly that it's a different threat to have them have to collect human intelligence from NGOs rather than have every text message, phone call, email, etc from and up-to-the-minute location data on every person they're looking for intel on.
I don't care if the CIA can call up every NGO on the globe and talk to 50 different people there to get 50,000 reports on the current civil unrest across the globe, collate them down in to usable intelligence, and present that to our leaders. That's literally their job. They should do that. Lots of that. All of it they can. (I would be shocked if the CIA didn't already heavily extract intelligence from NGOs.)
It's just a completely different scale from being about to know where every person is minute-by-minute, and everything they say, text, email, read online, etc. forever, to be looked up and cross-referenced whenever you need. Particularly because the conversations with NGOs have to focus on targets of interest, while they can literally just watch every phone and digital transaction. All of them. All the time.
So I'll be blunt: you guys are just wrong that them being able to get any kind of intelligence from NGOs, be it sigint or humint, that would make up for the firehose of digital exchanges being shut down or rendered useless.