They may have, for that matter. Do you check the issuer every time you go to a secure site? Do you trust them to do a better job securing either of those domains than they did with a large telecom in Austria?
They may have, for that matter. Do you check the issuer every time you go to a secure site? Do you trust them to do a better job securing either of those domains than they did with a large telecom in Austria?
Your browser does (for high-value sites). That's what certificate pinning and HPKP are for.
For that matter, since HPKP requires sideband key management, it's A) an admission that PKI doesn't actually work, and B) a pretty clear example of why the CAs are unnecessary
If you have pinned certificates you are essentially operating exactly the way 99% of us do with SSH (only rather better because there are several million eyes on high-value certificates), which means you don't need CAs anymore.
Pins are either built into the browser by the vendor, or assigned on first access AFTER a successful server authentication (via the cert). Pins are trusted/verified through another channel.
SSH Tofu trust occurs pre server authentication. It has no defense against an ALWAYS mitm. Of course there are far less ALWAYS MITM for SSH than TLS. You have no way of validating the pubkey you have written to known_hosts against anything else.
Right, sideband, and browsers do it manually for domains they consider "high value".
It has no defense against an ALWAYS mitm
For that matter nothing does, since at some point I downloaded my OS or browser (wherever my CA store is) to begin with.