Hackers say Friday's massive DDoS attacks were just a dry run
cbc.ca
cbc.ca
Probably these attacks would not be possible if all the money put into governmental surveillance activities would have been invested in building a secure and resilient internet.
This attack is the logical answer to the governmental attacks on all networked infrastructure.
The root cause for these problems is a primitive way of thinking that is a wrong recipe for the path humanity has to take to not destroy itself.
Competition, dominance, control, surveillance, fear vs. cooperation, consistency, trust, freedom, love.
This is not about ethics or morality. It is about the fact that this way of primitive thinking just does not work - it is a stupid recipe for complicated problems and just fails.
Neanderthalers that like to imprison themselves into hierarchies and dominate the whole world should be put into mental hospitals, but never into governmental institutions or positions.
We must stop the domination and hierarchy adoring primitives with their non-working and self-destroying ideas to find an appropriate way to prepare for the future and its challenges.
An important first step is to put the military dog back on the chain and show it the place where it belongs to and never ever allow it to infiltrate politics.
Military solutions must only be the last step of self-defense that we need to use when all politics failed.
A society that allows military thinking to penetrate or even dominate political ideas will be destroyed in the long run, as destruction is the only solution that militarism knows.
Again this is not about ethics or morality, it is about logic. If you throw a stone into water, it will make waves.
Second off, the government didnt force all devices to be vulnerable. "Agile" development practices which we trust so much are what led us here. Build first, worry about security later. The fact that a persons information is valuable to the creator of these devices and they provide a direct gateway so they could be accessed by a third party. And the fact that consumers ignore any possible issues that may arise because they see the benefits.
You talk about logic, well logically we wouldnt have computers or any of this if it wasnt for competition abd the desire to evolve. And logically trust and freedom allowed these vulnerabilities to ho unchecked because the software is not open source and companies are free to do whatever they want since its up to the consumer to judge whether its worth it or not.
I understand why you want to make this political and pro-love because arguably any problem can be answered by pro-love. But logically, you should think before you dpeak and attempt to frame your argument with a consistant locigal tree than start blaring out hatred for the capitalist system
Hardly. It's not like everyone stopped caring about security once they moved to Agile flows. The industry never cared about security.
This last attack on Dyn appears to be Mirai again, so devices with unchangeable default username/password combinations. The same poor practices that have existed since there were engineering practices at all.
The credentials can't be changed on these? Ouch. I didn't know this. Has Mira released any kind of firmware upgrades for their set top boxes and IP cameras?
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/hacked-cameras-dvrs-powe...
'That’s because while many of these devices allow users to change the default usernames and passwords on a Web-based administration panel that ships with the products, those machines can still be reached via more obscure, less user-friendly communications services called “Telnet” and “SSH.”
...
“The issue with these particular devices is that a user cannot feasibly change this password,” Flashpoint’s Zach Wikholm told KrebsOnSecurity. “The password is hardcoded into the firmware, and the tools necessary to disable it are not present. Even worse, the web interface is not aware that these credentials even exist.”'
Ship a product now (before your competitor), get EMA; or spend many extra months pentesting and laboriously auditing your code OpenBSD-style.
It's much easier to win the market first and then go on PR damage control the next time there's a security incident, pointing the blame on those "evil hackers" while your software has more holes than Swiss cheese.
Meanwhile, as an engineer, it's much easier to appease upper management and meet your deadlines (set artificially close by people who don't understand the development process) by writing unsecure code, shipping, and then if something happens, talking your way out of said responsibility.
Meanwhile, you're stressed out because of how impossibly unrealistic the deadlines are, and so you're making more mistakes; maybe you're also running off solely caffeine and three hours of sleep the night before while on the trajectory towards burn-out because you're putting in so many hours.
Somewhere in there is a middle ground that doesn't involve hardcoded backdoors
We've had some pretty nasty hacks in recent years, and with the National Security Agency that takes the public's money and actively makes our systems less secure, they're sure not helping our problems...
You seem to be under the impression that military largely controls the politics and that's why there are wars. It's not true, at least not in western democracies. Most wars start when they are popular (and they are made popular by career politicians and not military) and end very soon after becoming unpopular (and the military can't do anything about it).
> Military solutions must only be the last step of self-defense that we need to use when all politics failed.
That's a nice thing to say but politics fails all the time. In fact, politics fails way more often than military is used - in most cases, the solution for politics failing is just sigh and wait until maybe something changes, military is used in rare occasion where it's politically feasible and seems to be achievable by military.
- If you don't have a very well defined need for a short DNS time to live, set your time to live to a large value, perhaps a day. Then, as long as someone can get at least one DNS request through, they can reach your site all day. (Ycombinator.com, why do you have a TTL of 12 seconds?.)
- Get multiple DNS services now. Not just two. Get four or five, some of which are not widely used.
Those two things will probably get you through future DNS attacks.
Is this as simple as setting up the same records on multiple providers and updating your nameservers to point to the different providers? Or is there more involved?
Are there any providers which will replicate records from your 'master' provider, or is this going to be manual?
IIRC, bind has multiple built-in methods of keeping zone files synchronised between boxes.
You just need a primary DNS vendor which supports AXFR, such as DNS Park (https://www.dnspark.com/).
But I guess this excludes many of the popular DNS services that are used today.
Why is this not a default feature by DNS providers themselves?
I always assumed they act as slave copies for each other to avoid this kind of situations
The only problem is this seems be a tough one to get right config-wise and I just haven't had time to figure it out.
Anybody know of any good tutorials for this specific use case? I've googled it a few times and they never seem too easy.
While it's not exactly what you're looking for, you could use dnsmasq, you could use the "--min-cache-ttl" option to increase the TTL: but only up to an hour. You can patch the source to increase this time to suit your needs.
To exactly match your use-case dsnmasq would need to have a regular cache that respects upstream TTLs and a last-resort cache that doesn't.
You either meant to say 60 seconds, or forgot to factor your local caching DNS resolver in. Here:
$ dig +short soa ycombinator.com
ns-225.awsdns-28.com. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
$ dig a ycombinator.com @ns-225.awsdns-28.com. | grep -A3 'ANSWER SECTION'
;; ANSWER SECTION:
ycombinator.com. 60 IN A 54.240.184.14
ycombinator.com. 60 IN A 54.240.184.154
ycombinator.com. 60 IN A 54.240.184.206
That said, 60 seconds is still ridiculously low.No they don't. CDNs with the exception of AWS Cloudfront don't run on a cloud provider. Things aren't quickly spun up and down with any kind of velocity. CDNs manage all of their own infrastructure, POPs, hardware etc. There is usually a maximal hardware lifecycle since the CDN business is so CapEx heavy.
Cache-Control TTLs and DNS SOA record TTLs have nothing to do with each other. They are separate layer 7 concerns. The former is used by your browser and the latter by your system's resolver library.
I have never heard of anybody using SOA TTLs records to purge a cache. How would that even work?
CDNs generally give you decent tools to purge your objects.
Source: I worked for a CDN.
- Put up a caching DNS server on your local network to keep your regular sites functioning.
If you set a long DNS TTL, then you will not be able to move your IP addresses quick enough. In the DDoS world, you may need to nullroute an HTTP server IP. If you do that, you assume you can point the DNS to another, not-nulled IP. For this reason, keeping the DNS TTL to low values will make you more resilient.
Multiple DNS providers is probably a good advice, although hard to do in practice. The api's of different vendors don't always match. (cname flattening? geo-routing?). Also a real big attack will just likely take down all your providers. Using multiple providers may well _decrease_ the stability of the internet at large.
DDoS against DNS is not trivial problem. As sad as it may be, I'd say we must just assume DNS infrastructure in the world works. If it stops, then, many users will be affected.
My thinking is that the only way to stop this is to get users to lock down their insecure devices.
A constant banner would annoy most people to action. Especially if it was really easy to issue a fix. Download and run. Script determines the actual device causing the harm and patches it. Possibly asking for a new password from user. I guess this assumes that a script could be written to issue a patch for the majority of cases. If not, then how is this device connected? Script could detect router and apply fix at that point.
So we need:
1. IP addresses for the sources of the attack load.
2. A way to distribute patches for those IP addresses.
I propose:
1. Those suffering the attacks can provide this.
2. Notify users via websites coordinating on displaying an alert with tools to patch.
Alternative solution to #2:
Can some part of the ISPs that connect these IPs be patched to detect and block malicious attacks?
Back in the day, the Internet was far simpler, with far less bullshit. If your IP was spewing crap, you would hear about it. And you either resolved the problem, or got null-routed.
The Internet is far^N larger and more complex, for sure. But accountability still has a place, I think.
I wonder if Dyn will at least release a heat map of source IPs.
In the US I believe cable modems are static DHCP leases tied to the mac address of the cable modem.
Of course this would be an arms race of sorts if the next version of the malware simply added port knocking sequences to the compromised routers in front of these vulnerable IoT devices.
I guess that wouldn't make your customers super happy, but it would probably be effective.
If that would somehow happen, you could use this miracle to solve most of the problems on this planet. This is literally the biggest issue of humanity - it's extremely hard to get people to coordinate. Doing so usually requires forcing various incentives to align.
In this case, you'd most likely need a direct government involvement to make all ISPs behave.
That's exactly what government regulation addresses. A truly global approach would be nigh-on impossible, but it should be possible to get all ISPs in the states to come on board, for example.
The monopolistic structure of the economy is a problem the US suffers much more than other countries (by definition at the cost of the consumer).
(Although the tendency to reinforce monopolies naturally applies to all countries.)
I'd be surprised if they aren't working on it right now.
[0]: https://idea.popcount.org/2016-09-20-strange-loop---ip-spoof...
">THEN google, Facebook, Twitter, etc (major web properties) use this list to notify any of its users that one or more of their devices have been compromised and point them to a how to guide for securing it."
I am not sure I want FB and Google policing the internet. They have enough power as it is. This would set a bad precedent.
Even very lame passwords might be expected to reduce the effectiveness of this attack approach by an order of magnitude or two.
But the problem remains that these devices, more often than not just don't get updated. So in a year or two, there will probably be a handful of exploitable issues that won't ever get patched...
Hopefully not many, though I could never understand why unattended-updates package is not installed and enabledby default.
I've never seen that happen in native GNU/Linux applications, though. I guess it might be related to the XUL stuff in Firefox.
But given that Firefox (and Chrome/ium) are memory hogs that eventually get OOM killed, you need to restart them periodically anyway, so it might not make a big difference if the OS does auto-updates in the background.
[0] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/08/25/windows-10-...
But it wouldn't solve the whole problem, just make it a tiny bit more difficult for the attackers. Definitely worth doing, but we will need to address the culture of 'ship and forget' also or we will just have the same problem but with software exploits.
Most better routers nowadays can already isolate devices from the internet/whitelist specific domains (family filter functions) and offer VPNs from the outside. From a technology perspective that's most of the pieces you need. Make a better UPnP implementation with user confirmation, make it easier to configure and everybody can get their devices nicely isolated-but-accessible.
That seems like the best solution. Now we just need to enforce that as a standard with internet connected devices.
Now if only we could get a standard router manufactures to stick to :-P
Sadly I can see IoT having to go though the same slow learning curve.
Just imagine how many scammers would pop up to 'secure' things for people locked offline.
Hacking a webcam would no longer lead to the ability to ddos websites, it would be a direct and total shutdown of the domestic internet supply.
Really this is about incentives: manufactures and users have little incentive to worry about security if the losers are third-party the targets of a DDOS.
Things will only improve when there is liability: either the manufacturers or the users get fined when their stuff becomes an attack vector. Fining users will probably never be politically possible, but I suspect it would be the better option.
That is fining manufacturers would lead to strict and expensive regulations saying just how things must be done, but which are laughed at by baddies developing new exploits that work within these particular rules.
On the other hand, if the rule is "if your box does bad stuff, then you must pay" -- then consumers will look to security as part of the good reputation of the vendor.
That extra layer of indirection is what I look for to avoid "last war" type scenarios.
There is already https://twitter.com/internetofshit of course. But that is more whimsy and fun "Oh look my toaster is tweeting, that's silly".
This attack is more like "Oh-oh, my toaster killed Twitter".
So even though as a thing IoT is here to stay, I think the phrase itself will sound negative and will be avoided.
I have a friend that is pretty much being persecuted by the state of Oklahoma for this very thing right now because the DA, OSBI (oklahoma state bureau of investigations.) and defense attorneys didn't understand how somebody can coincidentally be innocent of the illegal torrenting that appears to being going on from their IP, albeit said activity being totally unbeknownst to them.
EDIT: this is the only realistic way of securing the devices.
A pity we can't have digital locks that 'break' when used, leaving some fingerprint from the perpretrator.
[1] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/10/security_econ...
As for the IoT, the appliances could have their firmware in ROM instead of flash. Then, the malmare would not survive a reboot. Many customers are large scale enough (Microsoft, Google, governments, etc.) that they can demand it of vendors and vendors will deliver. Really, how often do you desire to update the firmware on your hard drive, your USB stick, etc.?
(Another way to do it is to have the write-enable line controlled by a physical switch or jumper.)
The only thing I can figure is everyone has forgotten what ROM is.
Also, jumpers are cheap. Just set the jumper to enable writes, and download the update.
Are you happy with it being unknowable which of your appliances are compromised or not? Would you pay $1 more for a disk drive with firmware in ROM? I would. If you were running a banking system, would you pay extra for code in ROM that cannot be compromised?
As for IoT devices, I can't imagine average Joe or Jane prying off their smart whatever, destroying the pretty plastic casing it's hidden in, and manually setting jumpers to flash firmware.
I don't think the current scheme is working very well. Even worse, there is no way to tell if your appliance has been compromised or not. There are a lot of companies that care whether their machines are infected or not.
I think in all honesty the regulation sounds best, requiring the router makers to disable features such as UPNP would prevent massive attacks like these.
But then the device would be 'hacked' again within minutes of it coming back online.
Why? The rest of your comment doesn't address that.
>See Bruce Schneier's recent article on the matter, where he makes the case that government regulation is the only feasible remedy at this point
He also doesn't explain why. He literally writes:
>>In fact, the software used to attack Krebs was simple and amateurish. What this attack demonstrates is that the economics of the IoT mean that it will remain insecure unless government steps in to fix the problem. This is a market failure that can't get fixed on its own.
Why does it demonstrate that? "Neither the seller nor the buyer care" can also be applied to traditional botnets using computers - if the botnet is clever enough to not make any noise. He "justifies" the "sellers don't care" part with:
>>they're now selling newer and better models, and the original buyers only cared about price and features.
... again the same for smartphones or laptops. And furthermore, what regulation he proposes to solve this? I mean, he presents the issue as being:
>>The security of our computers and phones also comes from the fact that we replace them regularly. We buy new laptops every few years. We get new phones even more frequently. This isn't true for all of the embedded IoT systems. They last for years, even decades. We might buy a new DVR every five or ten years. We replace our refrigerator every 25 years. We replace our thermostat approximately never.
Would he suggest that the companies selling these devices be obliged to push security patches? The same companies that he wrote could not even afford testing?:
>>Companies like Microsoft, Apple, and Google spend a lot of time testing their code before it's released, and quickly patch vulnerabilities when they're discovered. Those companies can support such teams because those companies make a huge amount of money, either directly or indirectly, from their software -- and, in part, compete on its security. This isn't true of embedded systems like digital video recorders or home routers.
...
I have read "government is the only solution" at least 6 times in that short article, without exaggeration. Looks a lot like fearmongering and propaganda to me.
Not really. When a desktop PC is compromised sometimes it is noticed because eventually malware comes along that bricks the system, installs ransomware, or otherwise discloses itself.
But the sad truth is that a lot of compromised desktop PCs aren't noticed which is why there are millions used in botnets right now. Microsoft decided to take it seriously and pushed automatic updates, adopted secure coding standards, etc. It took a decade to make a good dent in the problem and it still isn't completely resolved.
>>they're now selling newer and better models, and the original buyers only cared about price and features. >... again the same for smartphones or laptops. And furthermore, what regulation he proposes to solve this? I mean, he presents the issue as being: >>The security of our computers and phones also comes from the fact that we replace them regularly. We buy new laptops every few years. We get new phones even more frequently. This isn't true for all of the embedded IoT systems. They last for years, even decades. We might buy a new DVR every five or ten years. We replace our refrigerator every 25 years. We replace our thermostat approximately never. >Would he suggest that the companies selling these devices be obliged to push security patches? The same companies that he wrote could not even afford testing?:
If all manufacturers have to meet certain standards then no one can undercut anyone else by skipping out. You can save some money by not including various safety features but then you can't sell those devices to over half the world so what's the point? If it is all voluntary you have busy consumers who don't have the requisite background knowledge (nor the time) to learn the details of software security, nor audit the code for secure coding standards and that's assuming the code was even available. If you want to make the claim that every human being should be an expert at evaluating such claims that's a massive inefficiency.
Really that's the primary problem with libertarian ideas in general: it introduces massive inefficiencies in the market. Not everyone can be an expert in chemistry, software, mechanical design, food safety, et al simultaneously. (Not to mention needing perfect and instantaneous information). Claiming that lawsuits will fix everything after-the-fact ignores the real human cost, the lost potential of the ruined lives, and doesn't work unless you completely eliminate the corporate veil and make everyone personally liable. Otherwise every company will just be incorporated with various shells to ensure you can't actually recover anything. That goes on today - get sued? File bankruptcy and re-incorporate under a new name. You don't even need to move the factory because the seller was just leasing it from your shell incorporated in the Bahamas.
>>Companies like Microsoft, Apple, and Google spend a lot of time testing their code before it's released, and quickly patch vulnerabilities when they're discovered. Those companies can support such teams because those companies make a huge amount of money, either directly or indirectly, from their software -- and, in part, compete on its security. This isn't true of embedded systems like digital video recorders or home routers. ... >I have read "government is the only solution" at least 6 times in that short article, without exaggeration. Looks a lot like fearmongering and propaganda to me.
Did you just not get on the internet this Friday or what? It isn't fear mongering, we're living in a world right now where there are millions of cheaply made IoT devices with hard-coded telnet ports wide-open. They can't ever be fixed because they weren't made with any ability to update the firmware. Their owners don't even know they are infected.
What mechanism are you proposing to magically make the manufacturers or consumers a) give a shit and b) gain the capability to evaluate products on a security basis?
This is a classic tragedy of the commons situation. Each individual makes a rational decision for themselves (saving money) but it results in a massively bad outcome for the whole world.
lol
IoT companies have been pushing crappy proprietary solutions for a while now; mobile phones and computers are exempt from this primarily because they run a few major OSes, which can be relatively easily patched. IoT devices are a shithole of poorly written code that doesn't even work properly, let alone securely.
Not that big companies don't try to sell crap - but they can't so easily evade consequences, so they at least have to think about self-preservation.
First, a mad rush towards the IoT where every startup and their dog wants to setup their business on IoT. Then comes fear as the hackers try to exploit every hole in IoT devices. And finally, once people realize the importance of keeping with the software upgrades, the market will settle somewhere in between.
But nowadays malware is less about "hijinks" and more about criminal enterprises that profit from staying hidden, so pressure on device owners and makers is going to have to come from somewhere else: ISPs, governments, ...
I guess we'll know soon.
The factory default setting should require a password to be set before the device functions.
It sounds like they never get patched, and if you have some camera or small device, how likely are you to throw it away?
The people buying these things aren't buying quality or security minded devices. They're buying the cheapest device they can find. Their next device will be the same.
As far as I know, my router does not forward incoming traffic. How would it know which device to forward it to anyhow?
But in a block chain, a Sybil attack—imagine voter election fraud, where numerous fake IDs are made to vote for a candidate—is blocked by making the cost of generating hash values (government ID is pretty hard to counterfeit) extremely high.
Can the same methodology be applied to blocked DDoS attacks?
Like using Dyn to find a domain is similar to making a phone booth call to yellow book call center, why not just raise the price of calling from 25c to $1.00?
In the first place, the requests are being made by owned IoT devices. So making the requests more expensive (in time, bandwidth, or actual money) would just hurt the owners of those devices. The people operating the botnet wouldn't care, they'd just get a larger botnet.
Is there a way to enforce a limit on requests from IoT, or a way to increase costs of running a botnet but not have that cost transfer to the owners of IoT?
Something I've wondered is how much of an impact large botnets have on other systems they rely on. If you had a million compromised CPUs in a small geographic area suddenly jump from a low power state into doing a massive amount of work, could it cause localized brown outs? Some napkin math says probably not, but it's not something I've heard considered much before.
I bet that a greyhat will find a way to brick a lot of these cameras.
A chaos monkey for internet security - now that's an interesting thought!
That could actually work. Market forces aren't strong enough currently to force manufacturers to get security right, since the average user doesn't really care that much about it. But if it became common for any poorly secured product to turn into a brick as soon as you connect it to the Internet, users would pretty quickly figure out what brands to buy and bring some serious pressure to bear on the others...
1. Introduction
Firewalls [CBR03], packet filters, intrusion detection systems, and
the like often have difficulty distinguishing between packets that
have malicious intent and those that are merely unusual. The problem
is that making such determinations is hard. To solve this problem,
we define a security flag, known as the "evil" bit, in the IPv4
[RFC791] header. Benign packets have this bit set to 0; those that
are used for an attack will have the bit set to 1.
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3514.txtAs Wikipedia puts it:
> The evil bit has become a synonym for all attempts to seek simple technical solutions for difficult human social problems which require the willing participation of malicious actors
Just the other day Cisco announced a partnership with a company in the UK to detect and disable copy protected streams in real time all over the internet.
Surely if they can pull something like this off there would be some serious solutions and proposals by the networking industry on how networks themselves can mitigate massive ddos attacks.
The whole focus on IOT and client side devices seems to be a deflection of the real problem because any attempt to solve this client side is likely to introduce serious controls and constraints on machines joining the network apart from the fact you end up in a never ending cycle to 'wack a billion moles'
"...attacks were merely a test, and claimed that the next target will be the Russian government for committing alleged cyberattacks against the U.S. earlier this year."
* 3 days since the latest major DDoS attack.
No device has been bricked so far. No counter attack yet. Waiting for the next news...
Also hilarious:
>Anonymous didn't respond to a request for comment via Twitter
> Then privision a new box and try to ssh to it with port 22 blocked.
Shouldn't be a problem if you've got your provisioning stuff set to configure ssh on an alternate port.
> I could of course run fail2ban or a firewall rule in order to block at 3 failed attempts
A good idea, but still an additional step beyond simply using a different port.
> and still run on port 22
And you'll still end up on the receiving end of more malicious traffic than if you'd not used port 22.
> Or use port knocking.
Not necessarily a bad idea, but still far more complex than simply using a non-default port. Same reason that many ISPs (including Amazon) place more restrictions on port 25 than other ports commonly used for SMTP traffic.
Worth noting:
>we are in Russia
Also their website default page looks like DDoS UI.
Regardless of any good intentions, it'd be a pretty grey area to deploy a tool that cleaned and then protected against future attacks on a device. The exploit (well, at least the one currently drawing attention) is targeted at devices running BusyBox that are compromised over telnet with a embarrassingly small dictionary attack. If you could clean any existing instances, the protection for future exploits is simple - set a randomly generated password.
The downside is doing this (without approval) to remote devices would likely break device functionality. The majority of users/owners of these devices are likely completely unaware they have been compromised today as it has little to no effect on anything they can see. Sure, a robing hood malware could clean up this mess pretty effectively, but the little side effect of stopping devices from, you know, working is probably undesirable.
It's draconian, but it would sure make users sit up and take notice of which manufacturers are slacking on security.
It's not about the size of the infrastructure, it's about the size of the political statement. Targeting larger infrastructure first appears to have been a move to demonstrate the power of their botnet.
Yet protests aren't comprised of participants who have been forced into attendance.
Also, a lot of them expose web interfaces that Google has already found...
You mean they don't qualify?
The word hackers has very wide meaning and this title can be considered to be insulting to multiple subgroups who like to think of them as hackers in a good sense.
I've been waiting for a good illustration to regulators of why POTS, leased lines, and satellite must continue to get investment & kept separate. On top of the small cases I have. All these people's shit is going down whereas the people using dial-up to BBS's or leased lines between critical sites are still doing just fine. I mean, they do gripe about speed or pricing more than the rest of us but that's the kind of problems they're used to living with. ;)
Note: The major attacks will also get regulators' attention to IoT risk. I have recommendations of techniques and existing products ready for that, too.
Note 2: I think someone will see this saying, "OMG! He's encouraging crimes and damage to happen! WHY!?" Actually, apathy by consumers and suppliers is why it happens and will get worse regardless of what I say. I'm just waiting for the inevitable as an opportunity to improve the situation.
Private contractors were swift to step in with their offer, providing ever more efficient and penetrating tools to get this job done. Citizens never felt so safe!"