Also his counter-argument on secure-levels is not convincing.
"Securelevels are an interesting concepts and they do help with security somewhat. Securelevels can only be increased not decreased on a running system. The higher levels prevent writing to /dev/mem and /dev/kmem, removing file immutable flags, loading kernel modules and changing pf rules. These all help to restrict what an attacker can do, but do absolutely nothing to prevent reading or changing database records, obtaining user info, running malicious programs etc."
Securelevels are what they are, and should be used accordingly. This is just bad judgement of the technology. Please don't assume something does more than what it actually does, this is not a good practice, please read the documentation and/or talk with the community, securelevels are well documented. It is very bad to expect securelevels to protect your database from being changed or your code from being abused and use that as an argument against the OS.
(edited, small typos: added an "it" and changed SO to OS)