Comment by dkarl | Hacker News Reader

Comment by dkarl | Hacker News Reader

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He probably means it's hard to sneak known terrorists into the United States. That much is true. Illegals coming across the border have a decent shot of getting caught, even if they hire experienced professional help, which terrorists might not have. Good luck going to Mexico with an Arabic accent and finding a coyote to smuggle you across the border. I'm sure there are plenty venal enough to take you, but there are also plenty who would recognize the prudence and possible intangible value of tipping off the cops. It's easier to train a new guy and get a tourist visa for him, but then you have to make sure the FBI never knew he was at a training facility, which is probably difficult these days. (With all the heinous stuff our country has done in the last ten years, do you really doubt we have a bunch of terrorists' wives and children living in custody somewhere, maybe in a very nice facility with schools and playgrounds, but still somewhere where we can send pictures from little Achmed's birthday parties as a warning to big Achmed of what might happen if he doesn't keep supplying information?)

Also good luck finding nine terrorist friends who wouldn't tip off police to a plot to kill children. True sociopaths are very rare; how rare are true sociopaths who are loyal to a group or a cause?

Either there are groups of terrorists who are willing to kill and die, or there aren't. My question is: why do they seem to prefer complicated plots involving heavily guarded airplanes instead of simpler plots involving lightly guarded [anywhere else].

The UK liquid terror plot resulted in 25 arrests: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_transatlantic_aircraft_plo... It was complex, required coordination, and failed utterly, resulting in 0 casualties.

In contrast, the Lod airport massacre ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lod_Airport_massacre ) was only 3 guys. It was a pretty simple plan, which would have been hard to foil completely, and resulted in 26 dead and 80 wounded.

The first plot you linked illustrates my point: they were able to get people into the UK easily, but failed because intelligence knew they were linked to known terrorists in Pakistan. One of the plotters was already under police surveillance, so the plan was doomed from the start.

I don't know why terrorists don't use guns for mass killings, but I suspect it has something to do with the psychological impact. You don't want the attack to be psychologically attributed to individual people who are captured or killed after the attack. It decreases the terror factor. You want the attack to be attributed to a group or a cause, which is much scarier because the force behind the attack is still out there operating. In a suicide attack, the perpetrators are seen as whatever force inspired and controlled the attackers, so there is a continued threat.

But part of the reason they were caught is that they were purportedly targeting airplanes, which are closely watched.

If they had 18 people willing to act as suicide bombers, why not cruise ships or trains, where security is much lighter?

But part of the reason they were caught is that they were purportedly targeting airplanes, which are closely watched.

I can't claim to have done any more research than simply reading the Wikipedia article, but it seems like the principle plotter was already under police surveillance, leading to a secret bag search when he came back from Pakistan, which kicked off a huge surveillance operation on the whole group. It was after the police already found a "bomb factory" (but decided to watch the group further) that they observed one of the men -- the same one who was already under police surveillance to begin with -- researching airline timetables. So, if the order of events as described in the article you linked is correct, the plot was busted wide open before the authorities realized they were targeting airplanes.

Just to raise a counter-point, I would contend that the UK liquid terror plot was successful in the terrorist's scorebooks. I bet the operation achieved what the upper level terrorists expected (realistically). The "mules" thought they would make explosions in the sky and I'm sure the upper level wished for that, but overall it achieved its mission:

1) They got tremendous publicity.

2) They substantially disrupted air travel. Heathrow was shut down briefly. The cost to industry (all industry) was substantial. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_transatlantic_aircraft_plo...

3) The long term effects (carry-on restrictions and other added security hassles) lingered for a long time (even now).

By that criteria, the shoebomber and underwearbomber were fairly successful as well, albeit not nearly as successful as the UK liquid plot.

A good point. The obvious alternative to terrorists being stupid and/or scarce is that their motives are quite different from what's usually assumed.

That being said, I'm also not sure I buy the 'terrorists hate freedom, so they want more big-brother security' theory. That seems much more likely to be a combination of a frightened populace and opportunistic government.

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