https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Pr...
https://lwn.net/Articles/698827/ (note the admission in the comments by all sides that KSPP is essentially about upstreaming all the upstreamable ideas in grsecurity, to bypass the sort of yelling that you see in those comments)
The trouble is that the incompatible ideas run contrary to Linux's philosophy of compatibility / "don't break userspace" being the highest virtue, but that at least isn't about personalities, just differing design goals.
Fast forward to now and you have kernel heavyweights like Kees Cook (former Canonical kernel/security lead now chromeos security badass extraordinaire) working on bringing these features into mainline via the aforementioned KSP projects. In the end, Linux is getting more secure, and it is largely in part to the hard work of the entire GRSec team, even if they're a bit abrasive to work with.
>The apparent inability (and perhaps more importantly - total unwillingless) from the PaX team to be able to see what makes sense in a long-term general kernel and what does not, and split things up and try to push the sensible things up (and know which things are too ugly or too specialized to make sense), caused many PaX features to never be merged.
Although there are other posts since debating the same point such as this one https://lkml.org/lkml/2005/1/25/141