> If we are going to shift responsibility from attackers to the attacked, there needs to be a clear and reasonable way for security non-experts to ensure that they are doing their due diligence, and for non-experts in the legal system to be confident that they aren't.
I'm sorry, but I don't entirely agree with that. I think if you deliberately take on a role that is potentially damaging to others, such as collecting large quantities of personal data, then to some extent the onus has to be on you to be competent in how you protect that data.
The whole premise of using words like "reasonable" in statutes and then developing case law over time is that you can't always predict every single possibility in complete detail ahead of time, and sometimes you have to make a judgement in the circumstances of a particular case about whether someone's actions were reasonable.
This problem isn't specific to IT security, of course. After all, any time you employ a new member of staff as a company, you are to some extent trusting that they (and perhaps their references) have been honest in their representations to you during the recruitment process. And yet, we still have businesses with employees, even though it is an uncertain world, and for the most part this works fine anyway.
> Without an authoritative standard that provides a root of trust to non-experts, everything falls apart.
I respectfully disagree. It doesn't take a big, formal spec to understand that you should hold sensitive information behind a secure access mechanism, and that sensitive data should be protected to avoid leaks in transit or on disposal of hardware.
If someone doesn't understand and follow these basic principles, then perhaps handling sensitive data is not a good career choice for them or their business. I would have no problem with a legal action against an organisation that compromised, say, many people's bank credentials, by leaving them on an unencrypted USB stick on a train.
Arguing about whether a certain state-of-the-art or controversial security process or tool was necessary and whether failing to use such a thing was negligent is for courts to consider, based on the testimony and possibly expert statements from both sides. If anything, this process and a reasonable burden of proof on the prosecution seem more sensible to me than trying to reduce a fast-moving field like IT security to a fixed checklist that might be obsolete within days of completion.