"I have a USB 3.0 controller in my system where Microsoft took over control of the driver, probably due to the hardware manufacturer going under. Anyway, the driver Microsoft provide is signed by the same certificate as they use to sign other drivers for Windows. But in this case, you would want the Microsoft provided driver to win out over any manufacturer provided driver because they are all broken in some way."
Of course they could have separate signing certificates for 'overriding' drivers, but that would be just as much a hack as using the time stamp.
It's your system, and if you chose to install the vendor driver (even if it's broken/old), it should use it... no?
- a user installed a top of the bill vendor driver.
- vendor goes out of business.
- driver has enormous security issues/doesn't work with some newer hardware.
- Microsoft releases an improved driver.
Should Windows:
- assume the user knows better and keep using the vendor driver?
- ask the user whether it can remove the outdated vendor driver (and any older one(s) still present), so that the Microsoft-provided one can take over? (even if the vendor-provided driver targets a broader range of USB devices?)
- do what it does now?
I think the number of people who would rightfully want to still pick the vendor drivers can easily be counted on the fingers of one hand, so my $0.02 is on the last.
All others would be baffled by any question asked and accidentally might pick the wrong answer.
It'd be far less of a hack, IMO. At least that particular hack wouldn't be totally subverting something with as much predefined semantic meaning as a timestamp.
Besides, it could actually fit into Microsoft's organizational structure reasonably well. The team that maintains default drivers could have one signing key, and the team that maintains override drivers could have a different signing key. Same deal for Microsoft teams/departments that develop/maintain drivers for Microsoft hardware projects (like Microsoft-branded HIDs).