Given the recent shift from data to metadata protection, which is the only justification for messaging centralization, this vulnerability effectively reduces security to almost zero.
Given the recent shift from data to metadata protection, which is the only justification for messaging centralization, this vulnerability effectively reduces security to almost zero.
I expect this is another case of UX/Security tradeoffs considerately made by OWS. Having native OS integration is nice, and probably the right answer for most users.
Signal isn't about being perfect (it's already made tons of concessions that make it useless to anyone "serious" about privacy). Instead, it helps raise the bar against bulk collections.
Bulk collection concerns the envelope, knowing who you spoke to and how long for is _exactly_ the kind of information NSA was tracking 5 years ago. Content was never the issue, content can be encrypted by default with non-centralised systems. What's the point of a centralised system now, that was its only justification.
As it stands, Signal is good for voice calls where one doesn't usually have a need to retain content of the conversation. For text messages, it becomes useless after sometime (when the user changes devices).