This is also horrifying. So there's a government database of plaintext passwords and a massive body of people have legitimate access?
This is also horrifying. So there's a government database of plaintext passwords and a massive body of people have legitimate access?
If you were dealing with a reasonable system, a compromise might be to unlock the accounts for them (without them seeing the password) and allow them to review the contents in your presence. That way you know exactly what they've seen, and that they're not holding onto anything, but they should still be able to do any necessary screening. Unfortunately the system appears to be weighted rather more toward maximum intimidation than reasonableness.
So you have to change everything + the master password, that is 1 more than you would have to change, had you not used it. Without a password manager, you could just give them the passwords they wanted, if you remember 20+ different random passwords. Otherwise you are reusing your passwords and so have to change most of them anyway.
>If you were dealing with a reasonable system
That this could seriously be described as "reasonable" shows just how much things went wrong.
And yes, I agree that having to show border guards your facebook account isn't ideal. It's a hell of a lot more reasonable than just giving them all your passwords and having them run rampant through your digital life without your even knowing what they've done or seen though.
One can't only act after going through, one has to change all their passwords to throwaway passwords before going through the border.
That is poor password security right there, even before giving your master key to some rando.
I'm not surprised they have access to a lot of accounts, but that's different from trusting that everyone working the front line at border patrol will use that database securely and ethically.