I like this one,
> DO NOT solely rely on SSL/TLS to secure data in transit. Rationale: Numerous man-in-middle attack vectors and publicly disclosed flaws in the protocol.
> DO NOT solely rely on SSL/TLS to secure data in transit. Rationale: Numerous man-in-middle attack vectors and publicly disclosed flaws in the protocol.
This is not too surprising.
In the CIA's use case (data exfiltration), this rationale is likely due to target organizations using a firewall which utilizes TLS interception to capture and inspect data, requiring the computer or mobile device to have a custom trusted root CA added in order to properly send traffic through their firewall box.
So the issue would be that TLS is going to be useless for protecting any data that is being exfiltrated, as the firewall box would obviously perform it's DLP duties and block their exfiltration attempt. Custom additional cryptography or added obfuscation makes sense in this case because they only need to get past the automated inspection, not an actual human. The data has already been sent to the LP by the time anyone has a chance to crack the additional layer of crypto/obfuscation and see the data.
If your attacker is breaking your TLS implementation, surely the next step is to break your shitty custom crypto protocol wrapped inside of it.
Postscript: Redford of course then goes ahead and basically announces it to the NSA by stealing all the Republican party's money (and someone else - can't remember) and donating it to causes like Greenpeace and Amnesty International.