Some functions that previously operated on those char arrays have been changed to deal with the more generic struct instead.
Technically MD5(128bits) and SHA1(160bits) lengths are sufficient for hashes, but they had cryptographic weaknesses -- the functions had cryptanalytic attacks, which reduced bruteforce from the complete keyspace to something of a much smaller magnitude. These weaknesses are what has lead to the deprecation of MD5 and SHA1.
It is definitely possible that new crypt-analytic attacks could be shown on SHA256/512, but none have so far been publicly provided. Hence the confidence in them.
Not true. A 128-bit hash gets collisions after ~2^64 tries. A big cluster can find targeted 128-bit collisions. To attack something like git, the entire attack can be done offline.
The big MD5 X.509 break needed cryptanalysis to make it day I because the attack needed to happen in real time.
md5 was first "broken" in 1995. As of 10 years ago, a collision attack took only a few seconds. Plus, there are a _number_ of other attacks on the hash.
64 bits of security is good enough against most non-nation state actors.
Obviously, MD5 (and sha-1) aren't anywhere near perfect hashes. And obviously, you need to look at more than length when judging a hash.
Basically my point was that md5's hash length isn't a big problem.
64 bits of ideal security is about half the industry accepted security strength in bits for a hash function.