It opens by parodying the classic futurist parable of history as exponential growth in intellect and technology, recasting history as a tale of growth in size (after all, the earliest organisms were tiny). It recasts fears about superintelligent AI as fears about super-large beings (wouldn't you be afraid of something that could step on you as easily as you step on an ant?).
Then it switches to parodying some arguments against the possibility of superintelligence, in order:
1. That intelligence is "irreducibly complex"; since we don't understand what makes people smart, we can't expect to make smarter machines. This, to me, is the weakest of the parodies in the article. We definitely understand size better than intelligence, and lack of fundamental understanding has absolutely impeded our ability to engineer things in the past. To get to the Moon, we had to understand gravitation at a much deeper level than "things fall down", or even than "things fall in parabolas". That said, total understanding of natural phenomena is not always necessary to replicate them: the Wright brothers didn't need to understood how exactly bird flight worked to build the first plane.
2. That intelligence is poorly defined ("human-level" AI is "meaningless"). "Largeness" is similarly vague, but an Airbus is still obviously bigger than a human. Vague goals can still be met.
3. That human intelligence is in some way "universal". I don't understand this argument enough to explain the parody. Can someone else chime in?
4. Psychological arguments against superintelligence, which says that the origin of belief-in and fear-of superintelligent machines is really evolutionary, not logical. This is a classic non-sequitur; if evolution predisposes humans to be afraid of wolves, it does not follow that humans have no reason to be afraid of wolves.
5. That the goal of AI research is to augment human intelligence, not supplant it. Another non-sequitur.
6. Arguments from the hard problem of consciousness, and philosophical questions like "can a machine ever be conscious?". Yet another non sequitur: even if you think a machine fundamentally can't be conscious, it doesn't follow that it can't be functionally superintelligent.
7. Bullshit arguments involving quantum mechanics, Godelian incompleteness, and other things with pop-cultural cachet that most people who invoke them don't have the technical chops to understand.