I've got personal experience with the first two (embedded devices and mobile apps) having pinned certificates (or limited sets of supported CAs)
There's millions of internet-connected set top boxes, tvs, and dvd/bluray players deployed around the world that run with a limited set of supported CAs. (e: Also, don't forget the tons of 'smart' phones out there running ancient versions of whatever)
If you're someone who supports applications that run on those, then your choices for what CAs you offer on your API/Media/etc endpoints is extremely limited. Some of these decisions were made more than a decade ago, and migrating off those is going to take another decade (i.e as old hardware dies).
What exactly is the issue? If an embedded device trusts Symantec CA, then connections from the device to its central servers will continue working without interruption.
In this example, the device trusts the Symantec CA, and the server presents a certificate signed by the Symantec CA. Everything's hunky-dory. What's the problem?
So now if Google go ahead and distrust Symantec CAs, I need to duplicate that infrstructure (or at least the configuration at load balancers, etc) - this leads to all sorts of complexity.
Well yes if your "embedded" device has a user-facing webbrowser you will need the public CA system, but then I'd wager if you shipped such a device and don't have ongoing updates you have much much bigger problems than an outdated set of root CAs.
But there is zero reason for your mobile app communicating exclusively with your API endpoint to use the public CA system. You're paying for a less secure system with all the same hassles.
It's a bunch of command line scripts because if you are using it any different way you are probably doing it wrong.
But if the net effect is that one bug in a frontend can cause the server to tell the cert server to tell the secure enclave to tell the wire mesh protected crypto coprocessor to sign a bogus certificate then what are we really doing here.
We looked at various systems to manage intermediate ca issuance and reminders for renewal and the cost was incredible... most were >$200k!
Using scripts to automatically generate certificates and using the ugly but effective Windows CA web interface for "vanity" stuff does 90% of what those solutions do. I think we had an intern write a monitoring plugin to open tickets for soon to expire certificates and a few other things that covered the remaining 10%.
An API is required for you to have proper infrastructure as code and leaving any bit to human input other than another validation step in the automated process is waiting for errors to happen (invalid or incorrectly spelled cert info, missing cert chains, wrong cert chains, etc.).
Symantec even calls out how much work these companies will have to do because so few of them have a proper certificate management system in place that's come back to bite them.
This is the exact issue with the public CA system, their automated processes have been found lacking and now what they certify can not be trusted.
And you're missing the point I raised as well - if you have hosts coming up automatically, you either need automatic certificates, or shared keys. As long as you rely on SSL, there's no other way to go.
(For example of authentication: public CA verifies your domain, internal CA can ask the hypervisor to verify a token on your instance - not remotely in the same class)
Ideally you'd have some way of tying it into some internal authorization database instead of relying on HTTP challenges, but HTTP challenges would work too.