The Oil Disaster Is About Human, Not System, Failure
online.wsj.com
online.wsj.com
Or is it just that people just screw up, no matter the system? If that is the case, and no matter how good the system is, eventually there will be another drilling disaster like this one, it begs the obvious question of whether there should ever be this sort of drilling again.
As to BP's corporate culture, who is to blame for it's failures - isn't the culture created by humans?
I think the distinction being made here between "human failure" and "systemic failure" is incredibly subtle, since any system has to be created by humans in the first place.
If the individual is liable, the corporation is liable, both for having initiated the project in the area, as well as imbuing the individual with the power and responsibility they have.
That's why it's a total non-starter that BP, Transocean and Halliburton appear to be trying to make responsibility evaporate (much like the hydrocarbons on the Gulf) by passing the buck to other parties.
The contract for drilling is in BPs name. It doesn't matter if they hired incompetent drillers (Transocean) to do the drilling. They did the hiring, it's their responsibility.
Given that this is the industry standard, it is morally reprehensible, if not criminal, that more care was not paid to the red flags indicated in the oped, or the clear signs that something was going horribly horribly wrong in their piping operation. Lives were at stake, both of the workers and of the wildlife and aquaculture in the Gulf.
I don't know of any human activity which is immune from human screw ups, do you?
Why didn't someone ask, "what if the blowout preventer fails more than a mile under water?" I bet somebody did, but no one listened to them.
EDIT: If it's possible for someone to screw up using the BOP, why didn't they plan for this? The entire industry only needed one TopHat that they knew would've worked.
We do have a problem of the regulators being in bed with the regulated. The rig should have been shut down because of violations long before the blowout, just as the WVA coal mine should have been shutdown because of safety violations
BP were the architects/designers of the whole affair as well as the entity that made the high level operational decisions like when and how to replace the mud with seawater.
When the people operating the entire system simply disregard the rules in a massive scale, that's a human failure. No rules-based solution can work, or be blamed, if the people are ignoring it, and "flying by the seat of their pants." All good systems have redundancy/fault-tolerance built in, and will tolerate some cheating. When the people, including the auditors (government employees) choose to throw out the rules, that's a human failure.
In all fairness, I've read detailed accounts about how BP specified an inadequate cementing, but since when have inconvenient facts like that mattered in D.C.?
Mr Barr was appointed Managing Directors of the Company on 25 January 2005.
Mr Barr is a petroleum geologist with over 30 year's experience, including
11 years with Santos. In recent years, Mr Barr has specialised in tight
gas exploration, drilling and completion and is considered an expert
in this field. Prior to joining Samson, Mr Barr was employed as Managing
Director by Ausam Resources from 1999 to 2003 and as was the owner of Barco
Exploration from 2003 to 2005.I don't understand what in the article leads you to the conclusion that it's propaganda.
Backing up those facts are e.g. the reports on the top Transocean guy on the rig, Jimmy Harrell. Another worker has reported that after the meeting with BP where the latter decided to remove the mud Harrell said "Well, I guess that's what we have those pinchers for" (the BOP shears that failed for one reason or another).
A less well sourced report has him saying this while on a boat to someone in Houston:
"Are you fucking happy? Are you fucking happy? The rig's on fire! I told you this was gonna happen.
"I am fucking calm. "You realize the rig is burning?"
1) The "system" which, in the article, refers to the standard procedures and best practices one should follow when monitoring and running an oil well of this type. From what the author said, it appears that if the people at the well had followed these procedures the blowout wouldn't have happened.
2) Human error -- people being careless, rushed, drunk, tired, not understanding procedures, etc. This is the "people aren't immune to screw-ups" factor. It's not clear how much this applies to this particular incident.
3) There's another sort of "system" that 1) and 2) are embedded in, and that is the system of incentives in which people operate. This includes things like your manager pressuring you to "do it anyway", or knowing that your promotion depends on cutting corners and being under budget. I suspect that this is the root of the problem, in this case.
One reason these incentives are the way they are is because they often work --- the company saves money (or the individual gets his promotion) and even when things go wrong the cost of the failure may be less than the money saved (though, that likely won't be true in the case of BP). Other reasons may involve not fully understanding the risks, or principal/agent issues.
Despite the headline, the article itself is good.
Systems themselves are sometimes inadequate to prevent failure, but this follows from a lack of human creativity, rather than the inability to follow straightforward rules.
Is it normal procedure to flood the platform with water when there's a fire? Can enough water sprayed on a platform make it capsize? I guess if the blowout preventer fails, there's no other choice to put out the fire. Who oversaw the recovery mission after the explosion?
I think the Coast Guard oversaw the initial recovery, although many are questioning the decision to put out the fire and the failure of the Federal government to keep in stock fire booms as called for by a 1995? or so government study/recommendation for Gulf oil well blowouts.
Why not let it burn while trying to figure out how to clinch the pipe from below?
And as I noted, many people are asking the latter question, alhtough once the riser pipe detached and formed a shape like this (inverted V)_ on the sea floor that became much less clean of an option, one the Feds weren't in position to reconsider after putting it out due to their failure to procure fire booms ahead of time.