EFF's HTTPS Everywhere Firefox plugin
eff.org
eff.org
Until I saw that I thought of it as 'an attack'.
There's lots of security reasons why a company would want to do that, both in protecting from malware and protecting from loss of company IP. Still, a huge trade off between privacy and security, and I am not willing to make that trade.
Maybe I would do it on my own connection, where I was both the MITM'er and the "victim", but the whole ssl system is built upon trust. It's a shaky foundation (do you trust all of the root certs in your browser?), but let's not start poking holes everywhere in it.
Cheers
I've actually been using Privoxy (http://www.privoxy.org/) to do the same (among other things, like ad blocking).
My privoxy actions file for that: http://media1.mike.tig.as/files/privoxy-ssl.txt
http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/m.handley/papers/tcpcrypt-usen...
My biggest interest is in the much lower computational overhead for the server, which, I can hope, will mean it will get used much more often than TLS/SSL (thus the idea of it being "ubiquitous").
There's growing interest in the idea of "opportunistic encryption", where the results are transparent and beneficial, but not always guaranteed. (I'm working on this in a different area currently.)
I'm kinda an "all or nothing" person, so when I had previously thought about how to "solve" auto-encryption like this, I thought about requiring https across the board. Of course if you tried to browse like this, you'd have a pretty crappy experience. If you built in an auto fallback to http in case of failure, you'd have the same problem before, where any MITM can trick you to visiting unencrypted sites.
This is a good compromise of forcing encryption on the important sites (like banks), but still being practical for the real world.
A few years back, I looked into making an extension that relied on an RFC that was never widely implemented, allowing a user agent to request an upgrade to HTTPS whenever possible. This is the next-best thing, relying on the authority of the user rather than the server.
My guess is that the level of caching you'd want TLS/SSL to do is dependent on what kind of content you're serving, the usage patterns of visitors, etc. As an example, Facebook has relatively long user sessions, and would benefit greatly from caching and just refreshing the session keys. Something like Google search, where a user session may only last a few seconds and a couple requests... maybe not so useful. I'm not familiar (off the top of my head) with any in-depth studies on this.
You can send multiple requests over the same connection for either HTTP or HTTPS via the use of KeepAlive. There's nothing special about HTTPS connections which make them more stateful than HTTP.