I don't know what kind of future you're talking about. U2F gained 0 adoption and are doomed. What did they expect with $19 sticks that require USB?
Second, U2F is not about USB sticks only. It is a protocol that works over NFC or Bluetooth. Soon it will also be possible to use your phone as a U2F authenticator for your laptop.
Third, how is it not adoption when Facebook, Github, Dropbox, Google and many others have added it.
Forth, a lot of hardware already has support built in. Lenovo laptops, Samsung phones and so on. Android has added an API. The new Snapdragon chips have it implemented on a very low level that will allow key storage in a secure enclave with dedicated transport to the finger print reader for example.
Five, where are you getting this 19$? You can get sticks for as low as 5$.
When is the last time authentication technology has been adopted like that? I would think never.
Google has published a paper about their experience, https://www.yubico.com/2016/02/use-of-fido-u2f-security-keys...
adding != users are using it (they don't)
19 is price for yubikey, maybe some do for 5, it doesn't matter because it should be 0 and no hardware costs that. Making auth layer for general public as hardware is a mistake #1.
>When is the last time authentication technology has been adopted like that? I would think never.
Facebook Connect. Hell of a success. It's centralized, though (and we made decentralized securelogin.pw)
Google says some of their 50k employers are happy with experience. That's it, has nothing to do with users of Google.
I use it. My company uses it for Google GSuite (mandatory). I know many people who use it.
Also, this is pretty new stuff, of course its not used by everybody yet. The Spec has not been finalized for very long. U2F has actually shown very good growth. It has been adopted in some mainstream browsers and Firefox will have it soon as well.
Adding a completely new authentication layer to the hole web is a monster task. No solution will solve all problems in a couple years only.
> 19 is price for yubikey, maybe some do for 5, it doesn't matter because it should be 0 and no hardware costs that. Making auth layer for general public as hardware is a mistake #1.
Again, much future hardware will just have it built in. You have a smartphone anyway, why not use it as a second factor? Your wearable could be your U2F device. That's also U2F. U2F is a protocol, not a hardware stick.
Also, you don't need hardware. You can use software implementations if the server allows that.
> Facebook Connect.
That's federation layer and you can use U2F to make it saver for you.
No reason not to just revoke the old factor and buy a new one.
Even multiple tokens isn't a good solution for lots of services, since you need possession of the token to enroll.
Once this is established the hope to push the envelope further with future versions.
That's the reason this stuff gets adopted. Everybody understand that these issues still exist. Nobody believes that FIDO 1.0 is the solution for all problems that exist in auth.
I for one much rather buy two U2F sticks, then entering that stupid TOTP token one more time.
Currently people use passwords then add TOTP to increase security.
FIDO wants to improve the situation so they introduce UAF to replace passwords, and they replace U2F to replace TOPT.
What exactly is your problem? They did exactly what you wanted, they invented UAF to improve on the first factor. For high security application you can add a second factor. Are you arguing there is never a case for a second factor?
I really don't understand your issues.
Oh, how is it going? Is there any UAF supporting app, ie no passwords? All I see is slides and presentations.
> Are you arguing there is never a case for a second factor
Correct, once first layer is fixed and password-related attacks are mitigated, there's no need for u2f as it doesn't stop malware.
Even something as basic as hmac(masterpw, domain)-app would do better job than FIDO stuff altogether.
You can verify PayPal transaction right now with UAF. Not exactly a small fish.
UAF does not jet have much browser support yet, everybody is waiting for Web Authentication API that is in standardization right now.
> Correct, once first layer is fixed and password-related attacks are mitigated, there's no need for u2f as it doesn't stop malware.
That's just stupid. If you use a finger print sensor as a convenient first factor then you might as well still want a second factor.
The idea that there is never a use for a second factor is just total nonsense.
> Even something as basic as hmac(masterpw, domain)-app would do better job than FIDO stuff altogether.
The security of that would be far, far worse. Not to mention tons of other practical problem with that idea.
You keep talking about factors, which is just a word, not a technical term. I repeat: you do not need u2f with fixed first layer. No plausible threat model. Malware attack gets delayed, not prevented. If you decide to reply please define word "factor".
U2F is designed to add additional security by you having to prove that you physically own something.
> you do not need u2f with fixed first layer
Again, that why there is UAF, it has nothing directly to do with U2F. In UAF you have to somehow (bio or knowledge) prove that you are who you are.
In high security application you might want to both have local authentication (UAF) and additionally prove of possession (U2F).
> Malware attack gets delayed, not prevented.
Of course it helps. If you use your laptops fingerprint reader as a first factor, somebody steals your laptop, gets the fingerprints from it, he will still not be able to access your online accounts because they need U2F.
If its a website that uses password and you get phished this will be completely useless if they don't have access to your U2F authenticater.
So we are left with attacks that control your computer once you unlock it. Malware. And with malware we can exploit your computer right now (no "second factor") or few days later (wait for you pressing that USB button). My point being these both cases are giving same security, but second one is much worse usability.
>If its a website that uses password and you get phished this will be completely useless if they don't have access to your U2F authenticater.
Pre-condition to this discussion is that "first factor" is not a password but some kind of client certificate, i.e. phishing and reuse is not in question. Then we are looking at what U2F offers us: horrible user experience with most browsers+devices not supporting it for the sake of just delayed exploitation? Thanks, no.
I do wish more sites allowed TOTP (Google Auth) because it works well and avoids the third party dependency, but I'd be happiest if sites would just stopped disabling paste so I can use strong passwords with my password manager. (Synchrony Bank, I'm looking at you and all your dozens of co-branded web sites)