Keep in mind that software is moving towards a sandboxed world, especially with containers. Local attack surface is becoming increasingly valuable.
Keep in mind that software is moving towards a sandboxed world, especially with containers. Local attack surface is becoming increasingly valuable.
(That said, the same class of attack is in theory possible in the kernel, although the kernel tends to be way more disciplined about stack usage than userspace software.)
Another perfectly valid way of working around the exploits is to just have an installation with no setuid binaries or file capabilities. This is difficult in a general-purpose OS that needs to be backwards compatible with traditional UNIXy things, but usually totally achievable if you're building a machine to run some specific service. (And in particular it should be really easy within a container, such that these attacks would get you neither container root nor host root.)
A contained-process-to-actual-root exploit is basically either going to be an arbitrary code execution vulnerability in the kernel itself, which tends to be referred to as something more dramatic as "local root", or a logic flaw in the container security mechanisms of the kernel itself.
It seems to me that "local root" is quite commonly used for kernel code execution vulnerabilities. There's also the possibility of a flaw in a service running in the init namespace that is exposed to the container.