These are only as “uncensorable” as any other IPFS object, right?
Which is to say, not very. IPFS isn't even encrypted right now.
Which is to say, not very. IPFS isn't even encrypted right now.
Although, how is IPFS censorable? As long as you can connect to a node, you can retrieve its content. You'd have to prevent connection to the entire network to censor something (minus the encryption that you correctly stated).
That's not necessary if you can perform deep packet inspection or a MITM attack on IPFS traffic, which there's nothing to stop you doing right now.
It primarily has to do with Kadmelia and DHT. How does one consider an adapter or transit to IPFS as a "secure don't leak other addresses"? Does one run a secure IPFS for Tor and I2P? Should it be integrated with a flag on those interfaces?
The IPFS team wanted to get everything else settled, protocol-wise before going down the idea of secured, and hidden protocols, given IPFS's propensity of splattering all interfaces through it (even unroutable internal network addresses).
See: Firewall of China.
You only need to control the big fiber paths of which there aren't many. Of just in general the exit and entry points between countries.
The Internet is not an open mesh.
And once inside, you are subject to extreme government spying which can easily mean that everyone who gets a hold of unallowed content "vanishes".
Furthermore, this is an issue not even encryption can fully solve, you still need to do a key exchange which means you need to either find a source of trust in the other side via sidechannels (aka PKI, TOFU or similar) or you allow everyone to easily intercept the data without much effort (aka skip-verify on TLS)
The internet in china is not lacking in surveillance and censorship.
This is an issue that even Tor is still chewing on a lot, afaik plain Tor connections in China are not very welcome and even blocked.
So unless you claim that your crypt and security is better and more battletested than Tor, I'd say IPFS is anything but censorship resistant.
Another way to distribute once the data is within China is to do it via private networks built with cjdns or similar
Secondly, people can exactly not trust the data because there is no way to trustlessly get those hashes to begin with from within IPFS and you get back to normal HTTP which... is censorable.
Lastly, this also assumes that the one running the node is not arrested either.
>Another way to distribute once the data is within China is to do it via private networks built with cjdns or similar
Which again, assumes cjdns and other methods do not get people into possibly lethal trouble or aren't censored/outright blocked to begin with.
edit: You also forgot about the government blocking IPFS within their own country.