Why is Kerberos insufficient to solve the sign-in problem that we had to invent new protocols?
Why is Kerberos insufficient to solve the sign-in problem that we had to invent new protocols?
If you're performing cross-domain authentication, there's also another level of interdomain keys needed to create referral tickets, which are also symmetric and need to be trusted.
This works well in an organizational setting, where everything in the known-world is centrally managed. It doesn't scale well to the entire Internet.
Even beyond that, it's heavy. Arguably, that OAuth stuff is a bit lighter. That's more a taste thing. Kerberos, when executed well (see Google pre-BeyondCorp/etc), is awesome.
When a client kinits, no validation of the kdc is performed. As the kdc never gets the password, the most an invalid can do is issue you invalid keys, which will get denied by any service that sees them.
Severs require keytabs to validate user keys, and these can be much harder to distribute to all your servers that need to authenticate users.
Open ID Connect will support the more complicated "delegation" scenarios that Kerberos enabled. Think, authentication across multiple service boundaries. That kind of thing.
I can access my email via Evolution EWS through external name -> NAT -> (good TLS) HAProxy (rubbish SSL) -> Exchange 2016 using Kerberos auth.
I used it to connect to campus servers back in college, through my home NAT.
There is an optional field in the Kerberos ticket that can contain your client address, as an additional point of validation to prevent certain classes of replay attack. That particular feature can conflict with NATs. But it's optional.