Although the researchers describe mitigations that will dramatically reduce the information leakage, this is further evidence that it's quite dangerous to do software crypto on hardware that may be shared with an adversary.
Although the researchers describe mitigations that will dramatically reduce the information leakage, this is further evidence that it's quite dangerous to do software crypto on hardware that may be shared with an adversary.
I'd generalise and replace "software crypto" with "anything". Especially with things like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Row_hammer
Especially since they usually fit both those shoes.
Take stuff like that as a possibly helpful nudge in the right direction, not the one and only truth, regardless of who may have said it.
I'm not looking to either discount or treat as axiomatic anyone's arguments based on their apparent position along some authority gradient, if that's what you are getting at. What would be the point?
Wouldn't your statement imply that we should not be terminating TLS on AWS nodes? Is it even practical these days to not use cloud based, shared hardware?
Again, RSA 1024, we've known that's weak for a while now...
Of course, SGX is not quite available yet on server class CPUs.
It appears a runtime per-site-per-use license is required though.
[0] http://www.sharcs-project.eu/m/documents/papers/a02-gotzfrie...