Commercial aircraft have a HSI (horizontal situation indicator) located front and center on the panel in front of the pilots. This instrument presents about 12 distinct pieces of information to the pilot, but once again, on short finals, the pilots is mainly concerned with (1) airspeed (2) altitude (3) rate of descent on this instrument. All of which are displayed on the left and right edge of the HSI in the form of moving bars. The information in the centre with relation to position and orientation is discarded as unnecessary 'noise' under this extremely high workload.
You are right in that the co-pilot has to work in conjunction with the pilot to ensure safe flight. Indeed, in many cases, it was the co-pilot (or non flying pilot) that alerted the flying pilot as to an imminent danger. But that doesn't always happen either. Take the case mentioned elsewhere here of the worlds worst aviation disaster. In that scenario, the junior co-pilot of the KLM jet notified the Captain (who was one of the the most senior pilot in KLM at the time) TWICE that he thought the PanAm jet was still on the runway, only to be ignored.
I can't imagine a scenario where this ought to be allowed.
Now, the iPad part is not certified, but the nav/comm (including software) is.
Similar to how a map or GPS won't stop you from turning down the wrong way on a divided highway. Or how there have been many cases of people following GPS and turning onto railroad tracks that parallel roads. https://www.google.com/search?q=driver+turns+onto+train+trac...
It's not like it happens every day, so I expect there is some significant thought going into how to mistake-proof this particular problem.
It's not like the pilot doesn't know there is a parallel taxiway. Of course there is. They would be (subconsciously anyway) looking for it to complete their mental map. It just went wrong in this case.
You wouldn't even have needed a fancy automated system to realise you were looking at a taxiway in that particular situation. There were four big aircraft on there, with position lights and taxi lights and everything. And apparently visibility was good. It was just a spectacular brain fart.
While the system you're suggesting might give better situational awareness, it might also be a dangerous distraction in other cases -- or be wrong for some reason. So more tools aren't automatically better.
In this case the existing system actually worked flawlessly: another controlling instance (the tower controller) discovered the error, took appropriate action, and all that happened was a 15 minute landing delay and a good story. Probably happens more often than we'd care to imagine.
> Like I'm imagining there should be something on the plane that shows them their trajectory and the runway information. If there is, why isn't it telling them when they're going the wrong way?
Well, there's the ILS (instrument landing system), but pilots like to land manually. IIRC it's recommended these days, just to remain in training. I suppose it's also fun.
Also, ILS might be wrong somehow (interference, technical defects, the pilot accidentally entering the data for the left runway when he was told to land on the right, etc).
So the truth is this was just human error, and that kind of thing just happens. You know the saying: if you make a system idiot-proof, nature invents better idiots.
However yes, it's the copilot's job to double check what the pilot says and to warn if anything's not what it should be (like trying to land on a runway)
I mean I wasn't assuming that was the case either...