DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws;
d=gmail.com; s=gamma;
h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to
:content-type;
b=IBLt9oYlFSwflVBrLP4Rq64gpUeIHJMkvAjbVoYin9vugJBa4E4hxqfKeFLp/Gw3XT
2V/PR4M4M/Kz9CU8n7poGJ+JUBcxyT4LZc4SYNHTV1TD6nmk77Pvl7E7f8uY1sAMrR9c
F+2HiY9MMKgb0SlPdRVqUUF0QX9XoQRzA3jFs=
That's there because Gmail (along with a few other providers such as Fastmail) implement what's called DomainKeys Identified Mail (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DomainKeys_Identified_Mail). It can provide cryptographic assurance that the domain name associated with an email is valid. So using the DNS records on the Gmail domain, I can pull the public key and verify the cyptographic signature. mil:~ tim$ host -t txt gamma._domainkey.gmail.com
gamma._domainkey.gmail.com descriptive text "k=rsa\; t=y\;
p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDIhyR3oItOy22ZOaBrIVe9m/iME3RqOJeasANSpg2YTHTYV+Xtp4xwf5gTjCmHQEMOs0qYu0FYiNQPQo
gJ2t0Mfx9zNu06rfRBDjiIU9tpx2T+NGlWZ8qhbiLo5By8apJavLyqTLavyP
Srvsx0B3YzC63T4Age2CDqZYA+OwSMWQIDAQAB"
If the signature is valid, I can be reasonably confident that the email is valid. (Note that some sort of DNS compromise or attack would allow an attacker to pass me a fake public key)Now take a look back at the email headers in the article. There is no cryptographic signature that you can verify. Note that if these headers are made up, the forgery is quite good. There's even some nice SPF authentication going on in there. But it's not impossible to forge these headers. In a targeted attack, I could do just that. Depending on how much the guy got paid for the story, it might even be worth the time.
(If there's someone with domain knowledge/experience etc. in this area and has an addition or correction, I'd love to hear it)