Page 28 grudgingly alludes to the idea that MWI could be simpler than other theories ("Objection based on surprisingly common misconception that standard QM defined solely by Schrödinger's equation ... It is only within a many-worlds framework that this view could begin to make sense"), but later introduces MWI as a contender beginning with a nonsense news headline and then characterizes it as intuitively bizarre for proposing a large multiverse, as if the size for its proposed multiverse was an obvious point against it. It seems to me there's an implied misuse of Occam's razor: "Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity" is most properly applied to the number of rules in a theory, not the amount of matter a theory predicts. (If you apply it based on the amount of matter a theory predicts, then Occam's razor surely should rule out theories that dim clusters of light in the sky correspond to trillions of galaxies like our own, and should prefer theories that predict that they're illusions, reflections, or something otherwise insignificant that fits the observations.)
Page 39 and 40 both quote paragraphs from books that seem more convincing to me than the presentation's seemingly hand-waving refutations. Page 40's refutation appears to do nothing but insist upon PWT's "epiphenomenal 'pointer'", naming our branch as real and explaining away the many deep interactions of other branches as only being "mathematical significant" rather than having "ontological significance". ... Maybe this is a bad time to mention my preference for the Mathematical universe hypothesis ("which posits that all computable mathematical structures (in Gödel's sense) exist"), which seems to make the idea of something having mathematical significance but not ontological significance meaningless.