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Comment by jjnoakes | Hacker News Reader

I haven't checked git, but even if git uses exec*() directly and skips the shell (which I suspect it does), the problem still exists.

The issue isn't one of shell quoting, but one of ssh treating the argument list ["ssh", "-oProxyCommand=something", "remote-cmd"] not as ["ssh", hostname, command] but as ["ssh", option, hostname].

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There are C libraries for SSH, like libssh, that would avoid these type of vulnerabilities.

https://www.libssh.org/

One downside of libraries like libssh is that they don't behave the same way as your regular ssh command. So thing you've configured like host aliases, proxy commands, etc, don't just work out of the box (and in some cases may not even be supported at all).

True. It sounds like there is room for an ORM-like sanitizer for SSH that is responsible for translating a C API to sanitized commands. I have no clue what to search to find if that already exists.

It almost seems like ad-hoc text formats like command line argument syntaxes are difficult to use correctly.

libgit2 depends on libssh2 actually.

Exactly. It's an option injection attack. There's no shell involved.

Got it.

Seems to me the the use of "=" notation for CLI args would be rife with situations like this.

Yikes...

[also, still going through the code, but it looks like they are setting up for a call to exec*()]

Yes, which is why "--" is the standard way to avoid this stuff, and why people should generally avoid writing their own options processor and instead use getopt() or getopt_long(), which provide consistent, standard semantics.

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