There's an interesting argument that the revolving door actually prevents regulatory capture through encouraging regulators to be more strict. The idea is that the more onerous the regulations, the more desireable it is for corporations to hire former regulators who know the system. "Keep your friends close, and your enemies closer."
Matt Levine's take on it: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-06-26/strict-re...
There's a lot of stuff on real revolving doors in the UK in the magazine Private Eye. Stomach turning really.
All it needs is for companies to give big rewards (six figure salary for a day a month of work) to regulators who have previously done things the companies like.
Then their replacements will know strengthening regulations is against their personal interests.
You don't hire an ex-regulator for their expertise, you hire them as payment for services already rendered.
So "interesting" now means is "deceptive and ingenuous".
In a hypothetical world where corporations were akin to mom-and-pop bakeries that would need to hire power, sophisticated regulators to guide them through a very tough state, that argument might be plausible.
In the real world where corporations are powerful, forward-looking institutions who know full well that paying people involves a process of rewarding behavior, this argument says more about the person advancing it than anything else.
And sure, a lot of smart people might claim this, just as similar stable of smart people operate in the stable of the corporations writing arguments for newspapers and magazine. But maybe all those people aren't at all tainted in their views. I'm sure they could come up with hypothetical situations where they aren't.
I'm not sure if you're suggesting Matt Levine is "in the stable of corporations", but if you read his article history, he's clearly not. One reason (among many) it's fun to read him, is his incisive criticism of his previous jobs in finance and law.
This implying thinking and decision making tactics of regulators should be some kind of closely guarded secret? These people are essentially writing the laws that rule our economy, I'd think if anything should be public that's their thinking and decision making tactics.
And yes, sometimes they're even secret, because of fear that if their exact model is publicized, the banks will just optimize around it. "Security through obscurity", essentially. http://www.marketwatch.com/story/fed-says-stress-test-models...
All true, they are. But how implying helping somebody to navigate this mess is somehow bad thing? The bad thing is complicated, vague and capriciously enforces law, not people trying to deal with it.
> And yes, sometimes they're even secret, because of fear that if their exact model is publicized, the banks will just optimize around it
This is the opposite of how the law should work. It's like the argument of making the laws and the courts secret because otherwise criminals would know the law and would learn how to avoid being prosecuted, and would also be able to hire lawyers for the same purpose. Yes, they are, and that's how a normal country works. The opposite is how a totalitarian police state works. Sure, it's probably harder to get away with a financial crime in North Korea - but it's also impossible to live a normal life and enjoy freedoms we all have. I'd rather let some crooks slip through now and then than turn the country into North Korea.
It's that they modify their thinking and their actions while in the regulatory agency in ways that benefit the business interests, in exchange for a cushy job after their time in office.
Or the reverse, that they originate from the businesses and go to the agency to implement the business policies.
"Regulatory capture is a form of government failure that occurs when a regulatory agency, created to act in the public interest, instead advances the commercial or political concerns of special interest groups that dominate the industry or sector it is charged with regulating."
There are many ways this happens without a revolving door.